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An  Aging  Society:  Opportunity 
or  Challenge? 
AN AMERICAN  woman  reaching  childbearing  age in 1960  would  expect 3.6 
children;  an identical woman in 1990  would expect only 1.9 children. 
That dramatic  demographic  change makes it almost inevitable  that the 
American  population  will age rapidly  over the next 50 years. By 2025, 
the share  of the American  population  that is 65 or older will exceed the 
share  of Florida's  population  that is of retirement  age today. The ratio 
of retirees  to workers  will have risen by nearly two-thirds.  Even more 
dramatic  demographic  changes are occurring  abroad.  The share of the 
Japanese  population  that is 65 or over will rise from 11 percent to 19 
percent over the next two decades. If current  fertility levels in West 
Germany  are maintained  until  2050,  the population  will not only age but 
shrink  more  than  one-third. 
These  demographic  changes  have aroused  considerable  anxiety  in the 
United States. Economic concerns have focused on the burden  that a 
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growing  elderly  population  will place on the economy in general  and  the 
federal  treasury  in particular,  as well as on a possible loss of dynamism 
as population  growth slows. Those concerns have led to a potentially 
radical  change in American  fiscal policy. To ensure that social security 
taxes will be sufficient  to fund benefits over the next 75 years, and to 
help the nation save in anticipation  of increased  demographic  burdens, 
the social security legislation  enacted in 1983 calls for social security 
taxes to exceed benefits over the next 30 years. This surplus will be 
accumulated  in a trust fund, which will peak at 29 percent of GNP in 
2020  and  then be drawn  down as the population  ages. 
This  paper  steps back  from  the current  political  debate  over the social 
security trust fund and examines the more general question of how 
serious a macroeconomic problem aging is  and how policy should 
respond  to it. We focus primarily  on issues relating  to saving  and  capital 
accumulation.  We do not consider  the broader  question  of whether  the 
current  U.S. national  saving  rate  is too high  or too low, but focus on the 
effect of demographic  changes on the optimal  level of national  saving. 
In addition,  we consider  the effects of demographic  change on produc- 
tivity growth  and  the optimal  timing  of tax collections. 
Our general conclusion is that demographic  changes will improve 
American  standards  of living  in the near  future,  but lower them slightly 
over the very long term. Other things being equal, the optimal  policy 
response to recent and anticipated demographic changes is  almost 
certainly  a reduction  rather  than  an increase  in the national  saving  rate. 
Slowing population  growth will reduce the investment that must be 
devoted to equipping  new workers and housing new families, while 
making  it easier  for  the United States to attract  foreign  capital.  Although 
there  are  many  reasons  for arguing  that  the United  States  currently  saves 
too little, anticipated  demographic  change  is not one of them. 
Our analysis proceeds in five steps. First, we assess the coming 
dependency  burden.  While  it is true  that  the share  of the population  aged 
65 or over will increase  sharply,  it is also true that the share  of children 
in the population  will gradually  decline, and  that  the fraction  of the labor 
force that is near  peak productivity  will increase. Using information  on 
projected  fertility,  mortality,  and labor  force participation  rates as well 
as data  on health  care  costs and  the spending  of different  age groups,  we 
assess past and future dependency trends. We find that demographic 
changes unaccompanied  by changes in capital intensity would reduce D.  M. Cutler, J. M. Poterba,  L. M.  Sheiner,  and L. H.  Summers  3 
per capita incomes by between 7 percent and 12 percent over the next 
60 years, but  would actually  increase  incomes over the next 20 years. In 
only one of the next six decades will demographic  changes affect living 
standards  as much as the "peace dividend" is likely to affect them in 
this decade. The decline in living standards  caused by the increased 
dependence  would  be fully reversed  by a 0.15 percent  a year increase  in 
productivity  growth. 
Second, we consider the consequences of the slower labor force 
growth  that  presages  the increase  in the retired  share  of the population. 
Between 2010 and 2060, the labor  force is expected to decline slightly, 
compared  with  an  average  increase  of 1.5  percent  annually  between 1950 
and 1990.  The  projected  decline  in the labor  force growth  rate  will permit 
a 3-4 percent reduction  in the share of net investment in total income 
without  reducing  capital  intensity. Since reduced  labor  force growth  will 
occur before dependency burdens increase, projected demographic 
changes  raise the short-term  consumption  path even if the steady-state 
consumption  level declines. We show that in a standard  growth model 
with plausible  parameter  values, optimal  consumption  typically  rises in 
response to a demographic  shock like that experienced in the United 
States over the past three  decades. 
Third,  we consider  the  implications  of integrated  world  capital  markets 
for  our  analysis.  The degree  and  speed  of population  aging  in other  major 
industrialized  countries,  particularly  West Germany  and  Japan,  is more 
dramatic  than that in the United States. The increase in dependency 
abroad  will coincide with a deceleration in labor force growth rates. 
Along  an  optimal  path,  therefore,  the rest of the world  will export  capital 
to the United States-thus  increasing  U.S. consumption  and reducing 
saving  in the short  run. 
Fourth, we go beyond the standard  growth theoretic approach  and 
ask whether the coming demographic  changes are likely to affect the 
rate  of technical  change. With  slow labor  force growth,  labor  is scarce; 
this scarcity  may induce more rapid  technical change. Such a develop- 
ment  would sharpen  our conclusion that diminished  fertility  represents 
an opportunity  rather  than  a problem.  Using international  cross-section 
time series data for 1960-85, we find some evidence that nations with 
slower  labor  force  growth  do experience  more  rapid  productivity  growth. 
The  estimates  suggest  that  the reduction  in labor  force growth  projected 
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fully  the consequences  of increased  dependence.  This  finding,  however, 
is uncertain.  A more definitive  finding  is the absence of any empirical 
support for the pessimistic view that aging societies suffer reduced 
productivity  growth. 
Fifth, we consider the implications  of our findings  for fiscal policy. 
Because demographic  changes over the next decades are not likely to 
be associated  with reduced  private  saving, they constitute  no argument 
for reducing  the budget  deficit. There  remains  the question  of efficiency 
in tax collection. Maintaining  current  service levels for the elderly will 
require  an increase  in government  spending  from  about  32 percent  to 37 
percent  of GNP. Since the deadweight  loss from taxation  rises with the 
square  of the tax rate, financing  these expenditures  on a pay-as-you-go 
basis will involve higher  deadweight  losses than maintaining  a constant 
tax rate. We find, however, that these effects are likely to be small, 
amounting  to at most several tenths of a percent  of annual  GNP. 
We conclude by discussing the implications  of our results for social 
security, for intergenerational  redistribution  more generally, and for 
population  and  immigration  policy. Our  findings  suggest  that  population 
aging does not constitute a strong argument  for accumulating  a large 
social security trust fund, although  if national saving is deemed to be 
inadequate  for other  reasons, the trust  fund  may be a convenient  way to 
increase  it. 
The Burden of Increased Dependency 
The  economic  consequences  of population  aging  depend  on the nature 
of the  underlying  demographic  change  as well as the  relationship  between 
the resource  needs of individuals  at different  ages and their  capacity  for 
self-support.  This section  presents  our  estimates  of the economic  burden 
of increased  dependency,  noting  the uncertainties  associated with each 
step in the calculation. 
Changing Demographic  Structure 
Figure 1  plots the Social Security  Administration's  projections  of the 
elderly dependency  ratio, the number  of people aged 65 and over as a 
fraction  of the population  aged 20-64, and the total dependency ratio, D.  M.  Cutler, J. M. Poterba,  L. M.  Sheiner,  and L. H.  Summers  5 
Figure  1. Actual  and Projected  Dependency  Ratios,  United  States, 1960-2065a 
Ratio 
Sources:  Board of Trustees  of the Federal  Old-Age  and Survivors  Insurance  and the Disability  Insurance  Trust 
Funds (1988, table Al,  p. 93) and unpublished data from the Social  Security Administration underlying the published 
projections. 
a.  Elderly  dependency  ratio is  the  population  aged  65  and over  divided  by  the  population  aged  20-64.  Total 
dependency  ratio  is  population  aged  65  and  over  plus  the  population  under  20  divided  by  the  population  aged 
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the number  of children plus elderly as a fraction of the working-age 
population,  between 1960  and  2065.  The figure  shows the Social Security 
Administration's  intermediate  projections (alternative II) as well as 
outlying  projections  making  more extreme assumptions  about fertility 
and mortality changes. The projections agree in suggesting that the 
fraction  of the population  65 and over will increase, and the fraction  of 
the population  under  20 will decrease, over the next 50 years. There is 
very little change, however, over the next decade. 
Declining  fertility  is the principal  source  of the changing  demographic 
patterns.  ' In stable or declining  populations,  young cohorts account  for 
a smaller  share of the total population  than they do in rapidly  growing 
populations.  In the years following  World  War  II, the total fertility  rate 
in the United States rose from 2.4 in 1945 to a peak of 3.7 in 1957. 
Fertility  declined sharply  during  the late 1960s  and early 1970s,  falling 
to 1.7-well  below replacement  levels-by  1976.  Since then, fertility  has 
increased slightly, averaging  1.8 in the mid-  1980s. Preliminary  data for 
1989  suggest continued  increase, to 2.0. These changes have important 
implications  for the demographic  structure  of the population  over the 
next half-century. 
The demographic  effects of falling  fertility have been reinforced  by 
improvements  in old-age mortality.  In 1960, life expectancy for a 65- 
year-old man was 12.9 years, compared  with 15.0 years in 1990. The 
mortality  improvement  for women has been even more pronounced, 
with life expectancy at age 65 increasing  from 15.9 to 18.9 years during 
the  past  three  decades. Current  projections  call  for  further  improvements 
in life expectancies at age 65, to 18.0 years for men, and 22.1 years for 
women, in 2060.2 
Long-term  demographic  projections  like  those in  figure  1  are  uncertain 
for several  reasons. First, fertility  forecasts  are subject  to large  standard 
errors  and  are notoriously  inaccurate,  as is illustrated  by figure  2, which 
displays historical total fertility rates and the various Social Security 
Administration  projections for the next half-century. The range of 
historical experience dwarfs the range between the Social Security 
1. The relative  importance  of fertility  declines, mortality  improvement,  and interna- 
tional  migration  is discussed  in OECD  (1988). 
2. These  data  are  drawn  from  Board  of Trustees  of the Federal  Old-Age  and  Survivors 
Insurance  and  the Federal  Disability  Insurance  Trust  Funds  (1990,  table  1  1).  More  detailed 
information  on mortality  improvements  can be found  in Poterba  and  Summers  (1987). D.  M. Cutler, J.  M. Poterba,  L. M. Sheiner,  and L. H.  Summers  7 
Figure  2. Actual  and Alternative  Projected  Total  Fertility  Rates, 1920-2080 
Total  fertility  rate 
Source:  Projected data are from Board of Trustees  of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and Disability 
Insurance Trust Funds (1988, table  11, p. 37). Historical data are from Social  Security Area Popuilation Projectionls. 
1989 (1989, pp. 3-4). 
Administration's  optimistic  and  pessimistic  projections.  Even the factor 
of two difference  between the predicted  share of the population  65 or 
over in 2050  in the optimistic  and  pessimistic  projections  shown  in figure 
1 probably  understates  the true degree of demographic  uncertainty.3 
Postwar  fertility  projections  in the United States anticipated  neither  the 
beginning,  nor the end, of the baby  boom. 
A second important  source of demographic  uncertainty  is the future 
course of immigration.  The Social Security Administration's  interme- 
diate forecasts assume net immigration  of 600,000 people a year until 
2065-roughly the annual  level of net legal and  illegal  immigration  in the 
late 1980s. Assuming  a constant immigrant  flow for the next 75 years 
ignores potential changes in either immigration  policy or the level of 
3. The pessimistic  case assumes an ultimate  fertility  rate of 1.6, high  for example  in 
contrast  to West Germany's  current  rate of 1.3. On the other hand, figure  2 may be 
deceptive, in that uncertainty  regarding  the average  fertility  rate over a 75-year  period 
may  be much  less than  the uncertainty  regarding  fertility  rates  at any point  in time. 8  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1990 
illegal  migration.  The age structure  of the population  is sensitive to the 
level of immigration  because immigrants  on average are younger  than 
nonimmigrants.  George Boras  reports that only 3.1 percent of those 
who immigrated  to the United States between 1975  and 1979  were 65 or 
over in 1980,  compared  with 10.6 percent of the nonimmigrant  popula- 
tion.4 Higher immigration  during  the next half-century  would reduce 
dependency  burdens. 
Uncertainty  about  future  mortality  gains  is a third,  but  less important, 
source of randomness  in demographic  projections.  Most of the forecast 
rise in the number  of Americans  aged 65 or over is the result of large 
birth  cohorts in the 1950s  and 1960s.  Even doubling  the projected  gains 
in life expectancy at age 65 between 1990  and 2060 would increase the 
number  of elderly in 2060  by less than 20 percent, and change the ratio 
of the elderly to the working-age  population  by less than 8 percentage 
points. 
Although  there is much uncertainty  regarding  the future  age compo- 
sition of the U.S. population,  the broad trend toward a rising average 
age, a  greater  number  of dependent  elderly,  and  fewer  dependent  children 
is indisputable.  Moreover, uncertainty  about long-term  demographic 
change should not cloud the relatively  certain  short-term  demographic 
outlook. Labor force growth in the next two decades, for example, is 
largely  forecastable  given  the  fertility  experience  of the  past  two decades. 
Along many dimensions, the near-term  effects of demographic  change 
operate  in different  directions  from  the long-term  changes. To illustrate 
this we now explore alternative  ways to calibrate  the shifting  burden  of 
demographic  change. 
The Support Ratio 
Demographic  shifts affect the economy's consumption  opportunities 
because they change the relative sizes of the self-supporting  and de- 
pendent  populations.  We summarize  these changes  in the support  ratio, 
denoted a, which we define  as the effective labor  force, LF, divided  by 
the effective number  of consumers,  CON: 
(1)  o  = LFICON. 
The share of the population  aged 65 and over is one, but not the only, 
determinant  of this ratio. The support ratio is also influenced  by the 
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relative consumption  needs of people of different  ages, as well as by 
changes in the retirement  age, labor force participation  rates, and the 
earning  power of those who are working. Because there are several 
approaches  to measuring  and  projecting  each  of these  factors,  we present 
several  different  measures  of the support  ratio. 
The first issue in measuring  the support  ratio concerns the relative 
consumption  needs of people at different  ages. One assumption,  which 
we label CONI, defines effective consumption as if all people have 
identical  resource  needs: 
99 
(2)  CONI  =  Ni, 
where Ni is the number  of people of age i. This measure of needs is 
implicit  in the commonly  cited total dependency  ratio  shown in figure  1. 
An alternative  approach  involves differentiating  the resource needs 
of people at different ages. We develop this approach in a second 
measure  of effective consumption  needs, CON2, which  has three  parts: 
private  nonmedical  expenses, public education  expenses, and medical 
care. For private nonmedical  outlays, we follow Edward Lazear and 
Robert  Michael  in assuming  that all people 20 and older have identical 
needs, while those under  20 (18 in their  work)  have needs equal to one- 
half those of adults.' For public education expenses, we assume per 
capita outlays of $2,553 (1989 dollars) per person under 20, $309 per 
person  aged  20-64, and  $84  per  person  aged  65  and  over. These estimates 
are explained  in more detail below. For medical care, we assume that 
needs are proportional  to total spending  by age: $1,262 per person per 
yearforthose  under  64  and  $5,360for  those 65  and  over.6  Adding  together 
5. Lazear and Michael (1980, p. 102) estimate that a child raises equivalent  scale 
consumption  for a husband-wife  family  by 22.2 percent,  or by 44.4 percent  as much  as the 
average  consumption  of either  parent.  There  is some evidence  that  nonmedical  consump- 
tion needs of the elderly  may be lower than  those for younger  people. For example,  the 
U.S. Department  of Agriculture  poverty  line  assumes  that  food  expenditures  by the  elderly 
are  90 percent  of those  for prime-aged  individuals.  The  ongoing  trend  toward  more  elderly 
living  in single  households,  however, suggests  that  the relative  expenditure  needs of the 
elderly  may  rise  in the future. 
6. These relative  medical  costs are based on the current  age structure  of the elderly 
population.  As the average  age of those 65 or over rises, the relative  cost of medical  care 
for  the elderly  will  increase.  In 1987  total  annual  per  capita  health  expenditures  for people 
aged  65-69 were $3,728,  compared  with $9,178  for those aged 85 and  over. Holding  age- 
specific  expenditure  patterns  constant  at their 1987  level, average  spending  per person 
aged 65 and over would be approximately  10 percent higher  with the age composition 
expected  in 2060  rather  than  that  in 1990.  See Waldo  and  others  (1989). 10  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1990 
these three components, we construct a needs-weighted  consumption 
measure, CON2, as 0.72 times the number  of people under  20, plus the 
number  aged 20-64, plus 1.27  times the number  65 and  over.7 
The  relative  needs  of elderly  and  nonelderly  consumers  can  be affected 
by  demographic factors such as  mortality improvements. Edward 
Schneider  and Jack Guralnik  observe that only 3 percent of men and 6 
percent  of women  65 and  over reside  in nursing  homes, while 15  percent 
of men and 25 percent of women 85 and over are in such homes. The 
high cost of nursing  home care ($23,600  per resident per year in 1985) 
makes it an important  contributor  to the total cost of caring  for the aged 
population.8 
The appropriate  weighting  of young and old dependents  may depend 
on more than their consumption  demands. Many of the transfers to 
children  take place within  the family, while those to elderly  dependents 
are largely mediated by the government. A  Scandinavian  proverb, 
brought  to our attention  by George  Akerlof, suggests that "one mother 
can care for ten children,  but ten children  cannot  care for one mother." 
Individuals  may  derive  more  pleasure  from  caring  for children  than  from 
caring for elderly dependents, making  the burdens of an increasingly 
elderly  population  more  onerous  than  the burdens  of caring  for a young 
population.9 
We also consider  two different  measures  of the effective labor  force. 
The first,  LF1, assumes  that  all people aged  20-64 are in the labor  force, 
while individuals  19  and  under  or 65 and  over are not: 
64 
(3)  LF1  =  E  Ni. 
i=20 
Our  second measure,  LF2, recognizes  that  both human  capital  and  labor 
force participation  rates vary by age. We use data on the average 1989 
earnings (w) of people of each age (measured  in five-year intervals), 
7. The needs-weighted  consumption  measure,  CON2,  is defined  as 
99 
CON2 =  E  Si  Ni, 
i =,I 
where  Si  is the respective  weight  for an individual  at age i. 
8. Schneider  and  Guralnik  (1990). 
9. Provided  the "warm  glow" of caregiving  does not affect the marginal  utility of 
consuming  goods, it should  not affect our needs weighting  of different-aged  households. 
It will affect  the total  utility  of households. D. M. Cutler,  J. M. Poterba, L. M. Sheiner, and L. H. Summers  11 
along  with Social Security  Administration  forecasts  of age-specific  labor 
force participation  rates, PR, to estimate  LF2:  10 
80 
(4)  LF2  =  E  wiPRiNi. 
i=  15 
This  recognizes  that  the earning  capacity  of a society with  a high  fraction 
of people in middle  age is higher  than that of a society with many new 
entrants  to the labor  force.  11 
Support Ratio  Projections,  1990-2060 
Because the level of the support ratio is less informative  than its 
changes  from  year to year, we focus on &'t, the percentage  change  in the 
support  ratio  between 1990  and year t: 
(5)  (Xt =  (LFtICONt)I(LF1990ICON190)  -  1. 
We report  support  ratios  corresponding  to each combination  of effective 
labor  force and  effective consumption  measures. 
Table 1 shows the historical  and projected  changes in LF and CON 
and demonstrates  that regardless  of measurement  method, growth in 
both the labor  force and consumption  requirements  declines during  the 
next half-century.  For example, the earnings-weighted  labor  force grew 
at a 1.7 percent annual  rate during  the 1980s,  but will shrink  in four of 
the five decades between 2010  and 2060. In the nearer  term, labor  force 
growth  also slows. By the first decade of the next century, labor  force 
growth  is only one-fourth  its rate  during  the 1970s.  Total  needs-weighted 
consumption,  which grew at a 1.1 percent  annual  rate during  the 1980s, 
rises by less than  one tenth  of 1 percent  a year  between 2040  and  2060. 
Table  2 and  figure  3 show the percentage  change  in the  four  alternative 
measures  of the support  ratio.  Four  conclusions  stand  out. First,  because 
both our  measures  of the labor  force grow more slowly than  population 
10. These data are from the Bureau  of Labor Statistics, Usual Weekly  Earnings  of 
Full-Time Wage and Salary  Workers and Usual  Weekly Earnings  of Employed  & Part- 
Time Wage and Salary Workers.  We adjust part-time  workers to full-time  equivalent 
employees. 
11. This labor  force concept includes only market  activity, neglecting  the value of 
labor  devoted  to household  production.  It may  therefore  overstate  the historical  changes 
in the effective  labor  force that  were partly  due to rising  market  labor  force participation 
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Table 1.  Actual and Projected Average Annual Growth in Labor Force 
and Consumption, United States,  1950-2060 
Percent 
Labor  force 
Earnings-  Consumption 
Population  weighted  Needs- 
20-64  population  Unweighted  weighted 
Period  (LF1)  (LF2)  (CON1)  (CON2) 
1950-1960  0.74  1.18  1.77  1.66 
1960-1970  1.25  1.19  1.23  1.28 
1970-1980  1.73  2.05  0.91  1.13 
1980-1990  1.29  1.69  0.95  1.08 
1990-2000  0.83  1.07  0.70  0.75 
2000-2010  0.80  0.48  0.57  0.65 
2010-2020  0.06  -0.03  0.48  0.60 
2020-2030  -0.26  -0.10  0.29  0.42 
2030-2040  0.11  0.07  0.14  0.17 
2040-2050  0.00  -0.03  0.04  0.05 
2050-2060  -0.06  -0.02  0.03  0.05 
Source: Board  of Trustees  of the Federal  Old-Age  and Survivors  Insurance  and Disability  Insurance  Trust  Funds 
(1988).  Projected  data  for 1990-2060  use alternative  Ilb. Data  show geometric  average  annual  changes  in labor  force 
and consumption  needs  under  IIb. 
during  the next 70 years, there  is a long-run  decline in the support  ratio. 
The size of the decline is more sensitive to our assumptions about 
consumption  than to our measure of the effective labor  force.'2 When 
consumption  needs are assumed to be equal for people of all ages, the 
support  ratio  for  LFI (LF2)  declines  by 7.4 percent  (7.8  percent)  between 
1990  and 2060. When  we adjust  consumption  using our needs-weighted 
measure, the decline in the support ratio is more pronounced: 11.5 
percent  and 11.8  percent  for LF1 and  LF2, respectively. 
It is difficult  to know whether these estimates represent  a large or a 
small  burden  spread  over 70 years. They correspond  to between a 0.10 
percent and 0.15 percent reduction  in the annual  productivity  growth 
rate, which is small relative to the uncertainty  in secular productivity 
growth. They represent  three to four times as large a cost as the peace 
dividend  that the United States is likely to enjoy over the next decade. 
12. For  the period  1950-90,  the support  ratios  are sensitive  to our  choice  of labor  force 
concept, primarily  because  of significant  changes  in labor  force participation  rates, most 
notably  among  women. D.  M.  Cutler, J. M. Poterba,  L. M. Sheiner,  and L. H.  Summers  13 
Table 2.  Changes in Support Ratio Relative to 1990, United States,  1950-2060 
Percent 
Unweighted  Earnings- 
Unweighted  Earnings-  population  weighted 
population  weighted  aged 20-641  populationl 
aged 20-641  populationl  needs-  needs- 
unweighted  unweighted  weighted  weighted 
consumption  consumption  consumption  consumption 
Year  (LFIICON1)  (LF2/CON1)  (LF1/CON2)  (LF2/CON2) 
1950  -1.4  -  11.5  1.4  -9.0 
1960  -  10.9  -  16.5  - 7.4  -  13.2 
1970  -10.8  -  16.9  -7.7  -  14.0 
1980  -3.3  -7.0  -2.0  -5.8 
1990  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
2000  1.3  3.7  0.8  3.2 
2010  3.8  2.8  2.3  1.4 
2020  -0.5  -2.3  -3.1  -4.8 
2030  -5.9  -6.0  -9.5  -9.6 
2040  -6.2  -6.6  -  10.0  -  10.5 
2050  -6.5  -7.3  -  10.4  -  11.2 
2060  -7.4  - 7.8  -  11.5  -  11.8 
Source: Same  as table 1. The earnings-weighted  labor  force measure  uses contemporaneous  and projected  labor 
force participation  rates  and the 1987  age-earnings  profiles  for men and women  to form  effective  labor  forces. 
In yet another  metric, a three- to four-year  increase in the average age 
at retirement,  or a 19 percentage  point increase in female labor force 
participation,  would be needed to offset the increase  in dependency. 
Second, in the next two decades there is a decline in economic 
dependency  (a rise in the support  ratio)  because the declining  number  of 
dependent  children  more than offsets the rising number  of dependent 
elderly.  Between 1990  and 2010, when the baby  boom generation  is part 
of the labor  force and  relatively  small  birth  cohorts  are  retiring,  the labor 
force grows more rapidly  than the dependent  population.  This leads to 
an improvement  in the support  ratio  by 2010.13 
Figure  4 provides  further  detail on the differential  burdens  of young 
and  aged  dependents.  It plots the contributions  of both children  and the 
elderly to the support  ratio defined  using LF2 and CON2.  In this case 
13. Measures  that define effective consumption  with less weight on children  show 
smaller  gains  in the support  ratio  during  the next two decades. If the consumption  weight 
based on needs is set equal to zero for children,  the support  ratio actually  declines by 
between 1  percent  and  2 percent  during  1990-2010. 14  Brookings  Papers  on  Economic  Activity,  1:1990 
Figure 3.  Actual and Projected Changes in Support Ratio (Relative to 1990), 
Four Alternative Measures, United States, 1960-2065 
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=  P/(C  +  P  +  E), where  P is the number  of prime-aged  adults, C the 
number  of effective children, and E the number  of effective elderly. 
Then  the percentage  change  in the support  ratio  can be written  in terms 
of the percentage  change  in its components: 
(6)  =  (P -  C) [C(C + P  +  E)] +  (P -E)  [EI(C  + P  +  E)]. 
The first term is due to differential  growth  rates of the prime-aged  and 
dependent  children  populations, the second to the differential  growth 
between the prime-aged  and elderly groups. Figure 4 plots these two 
terms, showing  that  virtually  all the improvement  in the support  ratio  in 
the near term is from a shrinking  share of children  in the population. 
Most  of the long-run  decline  is a result  of rising  numbers  of elderly  during 
2010-2035. 
Third, the changes in the support  ratio between 1990  and 2060 are 
usually no larger than, and in some cases significantly  smaller than, D.  M.  Cutler, J. M. Poterba,  L. M. Sheiner,  and L. H.  Summers  15 
Figure 4.  Contributions of Young and Elderly Dependents to Percentage Changes 
in the Support Ratio (Relative to 1990), 1955-2065 
Change  in consumption  relative  to 1990 (percent) 
4% ~~  "  ..---  ----a---  ---- ~  ~~...  .. .........  ---  --- ... . .....  .. ..  ..  . 
2 - 
A  X  a~~~~~~~~~~  Tota change 
-8  t \  e  ~ ~~~~Sha-e  of  eldet-iyA,  \ 
-10lo.  -  Shat-e  of childi-en' 
-12  _ -  ...s 
- 1  6  X  l  l  l  l  l  l  l  l  l  l  l  l  l  l  l  l  l  l  l 
1960  1970  1980  1990  2000  2010  2020  2030  2040  2050  2060 
Year 
Source:  Authors'  calculations  using equation 6. The earnings-weighted  labor force  measure (LF2) and the needs- 
weighted consumption  measure  (CON2) are used.  See  text for details. 
those between 1960  and 1990. With our preferred  measures, LF2 and 
CON2, the support  ratio was 14.0 percent lower in 1970  than 1990. By 
2060, it is projected  once again  to be below the 1990  level, this time by 
11.8  percent. Our  support  ratio  peaks around  2010. One reason  why the 
slow growth  of real  wages in the U.S. economy since 1973  has been less 
burdensome  than it might have otherwise been is that the labor force 
participation  rate has risen. The figures show clearly that the gains in 
sustainable consumption from demographic developments are now 
nearly  exhausted. 
Finally, while the decline in the support  ratio by the middle of the 
next century is large, there is still substantial  uncertainty  about the 
ultimate  burden.  Figure  5 presents support  ratios  using  LF2 and CON2 
under  the three Social Security  Administration  demographic  forecasts. 
There  are substantial  differences  in the scenarios, particularly  between 
the more pessimistic alternative III and alternative II, which is our 16  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1990 
Figure 5.  Percentage Change in Support Ratio (Relative to 1990), Alternative 
Demographic Assumptions, 1950-2065 
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Source:  Authors'  calculations  using  Board  of  Trustees  of  the  Federal  Old-Age  and  Survivors  Insurance  and 
Disability  Insurance  Trust Funds  (1988) and the needs-weighted  consumption  (CON2)  and earnings-weighted  labor 
force  (LF2) measures. 
standard  case. The decline in the support  ratio is almost twice as large 
in the  pessimistic  scenario  as in our benchmark.  Even  in the  optimistic 
alternative  I, the  support  ratio  still declines  by almost  8 percent  between 
1990 and 2060. 
Capital Accumulation  and Shifting Dependency Burdens 
This  section  explores  how  the  demographic  shifts  described  above 
affect  the  economy's  sustainable  level  of  consumption,  and  how  society 
should plan for these  changes.  We find that sustainable  consumption 
increases  for  the  next  several  decades  and  that  an  economy  with 
otherwise  optimal national saving would reduce its saving in response 
to the coming demographic changes. D. M. Cutler,  J. M. Poterba, L. M. Sheiner, and L. H. Summers  17 
Steady-State  Consumption  Opportunities 
Demographic  change has two effects on consumption  opportunities. 
First,  an  increase  in dependency  lowers  output  per  person,  thus  reducing 
consumption  per capita. Second, slower labor force growth reduces 
investment  requirements,  thus reducing  the need for saving  and  increas- 
ing consumption  per capita. 
To examine the importance  of these two changes for consumption 
opportunities,  we assume that output per worker,  f(k),  where k is the 
capital-labor  ratio, is divided between consumption and investment. 
Maintaining  constant  capital  intensity  requires  investment  of nk, where 
n is the labor  force  growth  rate.  14 For  expositional  ease, we have  assumed 
away depreciation  and  technical  change.  '5 When  the labor  force and  the 
population  are not the same, consumption  per capita is only a fraction 
of output  net of investment  per worker. This fraction  is the ratio of the 
number  of workers  to the size of the population,  precisely the support 
ratio  (o) defined  above. The resulting  equation  for per capita  consump- 
tion is: 
(7)  c  =  ot(k)  -  nk]. 
This expression can be rewritten  to find the change in steady-state 
consumption  for changes  in a  and  n: 
(8)  Aclc =  Ao/ot -  [o(klc) An +  Aot  (klc) An], 
with c,  k, and a  evaluated at the initial steady state.16  Equation 8 
illustrates  the two steady-state  effects of demographic  change.  A decline 
in the labor force-population  ratio (o) reduces the level of per capita 
consumption  that is feasible given the economy's capital stock. At the 
same time, a decline in the growth rate of the labor force (n) permits 
more consumption  for a given capital-output  ratio. Society receives a 
"consumption  dividend"  when it is able to invest less and still maintain 
14. A substantial  part  of the  U.S. capital  stock  is residential  capital.  The  natural  steady- 
state condition  for housing  requires  investment  at the rate of population  growth,  not the 
rate  of labor  force  growth.  In steady  state, these two growth  rates  will coincide. 
15. We  incorporate  both  in our  numerical  simulations  below. 
16. We have arbitrarily  assigned  the second-order  term to the second effect in our 
decomposition.  We have also assumed  that the capital-labor  ratio, and thus the capital- 
consumption  ratio,  do not change  with  demographic  change.  The model  we present  below 
justifies  this  assumption. 18  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1990 
Table 3.  Shifting Steady-State Per Capita Consumption from Demographic 
Shocks, 1960-2065a 
Percent 
Unweighted  consumption  (CON1)  Needs-weighted  consumption  (CON2) 
Total  Total 
change in  change in 
Effect of  per capita  Effect of  per capita 
Effect of  labor  force  consump-  Effect of  labor  force  consump- 
Year  dependency  growth  tion  dependency  growth  tion 
Population  20-64 as effective  laborforce (LF1) 
1960  -  10.9  0.4  -10.6  -7.4  0.4  -7.1 
1970  -  10.8  -  1.8  -12.6  -7.7  -  1.8  -9.5 
1980  -3.3  -2.4  -5.7  -2.0  -2.4  -4.5 
1990  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
2000  1.3  0.0  1.3  0.8  0.0  0.8 
2010  3.8  1.0  4.8  2.3  1.0  3.4 
2020  -0.5  3.0  2.5  -3.1  2.9  -0.2 
2030  -5.9  2.5  -3.4  -9.5  2.4  -7.1 
2040  -6.2  1.8  -4.3  -10.0  1.8  -8.3 
2050  -6.5  2.5  -4.0  -10.4  2.4  -8.0 
2060  -7.4  2.1  -  5.3  -11.5  2.0  -9.4 
2065  -7.4  2.2  -5.2  -  11.5  2.1  -9.4 
Earnzings-weighted  labor  force (LF2) 
1960  -  16.5  1.1  -  15.4  -  13.2  1.2  -  12.1 
1970  -  16.9  -0.4  -  17.3  -  14.0  -0.4  -  14.4 
1980  - 7.0  -1.9  -9.0  -5.8  -2.0  - 7.8 
1990  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
2000  3.7  2.2  5.9  3.2  2.2  5.4 
2010  2.8  3.5  6.3  1.4  3.5  4.9 
2020  -2.3  4.4  2.1  -4.8  4.2  -0.6 
2030  -6.0  3.7  -2.3  -9.6  3.6  -6.0 
2040  -6.6  3.6  - 3.0  -  10.5  3.5  -7.0 
2050  -7.3  3.9  -3.5  -  11.2  3.7  -7.5 
2060  -7.8  3.6  -4.1  -  11.8  3.5  -8.3 
2065  -7.8  3.7  -4.2  -  12.0  3.5  -8.4 
Source:  Authors'  calculations. 
a. The table  shows the steady-state  change  in consumption  relative  to the 1990  base if demographic  change  were 
to reach  a steady  state at the level of the indicated  year. 
a given level of per capita  output.  This "Solow effect" offsets the long- 
run  dependency  effect on per capita  consumption. 
Table 3 reports  the size of these two effects. For each year, we show 
the steady-state  consumption  change  associated with changes  in a (first 
column), n (second column), and the combined effect (third  column). 
The consumption  changes  due to the dependency  increase  are the same D. M. Cutler,  J. M. Poterba, L. M. Sheiner, and L. H. Summers  19 
as the changes  in the support  ratio shown in table 2; the other columns 
show the extent to which changing  investment  needs offset this effect. 
Two results  emerge  from  table  3. First,  the consumption  benefits  from 
reduced  investment  requirements  are substantial.  During  the next two 
decades, the benefits of slower labor force growth will be about a 1 
percent  to 3.5 percent  increase  in per  capita  consumption,  using  the 1990 
base. Since the labor  force was growing  more rapidly  in the 1970s  and 
1980s than in 1990, the effect of reduced investment requirements  is 
even larger  relative  to earlier  years. By the middle  of the next century, 
the benefits  of slower  labor  force growth  will be between  2.1 percent  and 
3.7 percent  of per capita  consumption.  This is between one-quarter  and 
one-half  of the adverse dependency  effects of the changing  population 
mix. 
Second, while the investment  effect offsets a substantial  part of the 
long-term  dependency  increase,  it magnifies  the short-run  effect of rising 
support  ratios. Reduced dependency and slowing labor force growth 
both increase  consumption  possibilities so that by 2010, society will be 
between 3.4 percent  and 6.3 percent  richer,  depending  on the combina- 
tion  of labor  force and  needs measures.  Only  after  2020  does the increase 
in dependency outweigh the decline in investment needs and reduce 
consumption  below its 1990  level. 
The steady-state consumption decline between 1990 and 2060 is 
estimated  at between 4.2 percent  (with  effective consumers  set equal  to 
total population  and the earnings-weighted  labor  force) and 9.4 percent 
(with  effective consumers  computed  using  our needs-weighted  measure 
and  the unweighted  labor  force). As with the support  ratios, this finding 
is more sensitive to our definition  of consumption  needs than to our 
definition  of the effective labor force. For almost all cases, however, 
society is richer  in the new steady state than  in 1970  or 1980. 
Demographic  Change and Optimal Capital Accumulation 
The  results  presented  so far  suggest  that  in the short  run,  demographic 
changes  will raise the level of consumption  that can be sustained  while 
maintaining  the level of capital  intensity.  In the long  run,  they will  reduce 
the sustainable  level of consumption.  The question then becomes how 
society should  adjust  its saving  policy to these developments.  To study 
this question,  we use the standard  Ramsey  optimal  growth  model. 20  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1990 
We assume that  a social planner  seeks to maximize 
(9)  V =  f  e-PIPt  U(ct)dt, 
where Pt denotes the number  of individuals  alive in period t, ct is per 
capita  consumption  in period  t, and p is the social time preference  rate. 
We denote the current  period  as time zero. This social welfare  function 
weights the utility, denoted as U, of a representative  individual  in each 
generation  by the generation's  size.'7 Using our earlier  notation,  Pt = 
Ntlot, where  Nt is the labor  force in period  t and ot is the support  ratio. 
Our  analysis abstracts  from  the overlapping  generations  structure  of 
the actual  population.  Calvo  and  Obstfeld  formally  justify this  procedure 
by demonstrating  that  if age-specific  transfer  programs  like social secu- 
rity are available, and if individual utility functions are additively 
separable,  then "the Cass-Koopmans-Ramsey  framework  can be used 
to evaluate paths of aggregate consumption even in models where 
different  generations  co-exist.  .  .  .  the  planning  problem  facing  the 
government can be decomposed into two subproblems, a standard 
problem of optimal aggregate  capital accumulation  and a problem of 
distributing  consumption  optimally  on each date among  the generations 
alive then."  18 The social planner maximizes equation 9 subject to a 
capital  accumulation  constraint  analogous  to equation  7:19 
(10)  kt  =f(kt)  -  ctIot  -  ntIkt. 
If at =  1, equation 10 reduces to the standard  resource constraint  in 
neoclassical growth models. The consumption  profile that solves this 
problem  satisfies: 
(11)  &tIct  = u[ f'(kt) -  P] 
where  u  =  [-  U'(ct)Ict] [U"(ct)], the elasticity  of  substitution  in con- 
sumption. 
17. Some might  argue  for using  an alternative  objective  function  that  does not weight 
the average  utility  of different  generations  by the number  of people  in the generation.  This 
will lead the social planner  to raise  average  consumption  in small  cohorts  relative  to that 
in larger  cohorts,  because  the aggregate  resource  cost of raising  the average  consumption 
of people  in small  cohorts  is less than  that  for large  cohorts. We see no compelling  ethical 
argument  for weighting  people  in different  sized cohorts  differently. 
18. Calvo  and  Obstfeld  (1988,  p. 163). 
19. The optimal  plan  must  also satisfy  transversality  conditions  noted  for example  by 
Blanchard  and  Fischer  (1989). D.  M.  Cutler, J.  M. Poterba,  L. M. Sheiner,  and L. H.  Summers  21 
Figure  6. Steady-State  Consumption  Response  to an Increase  in Dependency 
(Decline  in a) 
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In steady state with no technical progress, per capita consumption 
and the capital-labor  ratio must be constant. From the Euler equation 
11, we find  that  constant  consumption  requires 
(12)  k*  =f'-lI(p). 
This locus, a vertical  line in (c, k)  space, is drawn  in figure  6. Constancy 
of the capital-labor  ratio given in equation 7 yields the second locus 
depicted  in figure  6 as the solid line  k =  0. 
Permanent  reductions  in a, the support  ratio, scale back the feasible 
level of per capita consumption  for each k, shifting  the k =  0 locus as 
shown  by the dashed  line in figure  6. The steady-state  capital-labor  ratio 
is unaffected by this change, so the only effect of this shock is an 
immediate  and  permanent  decline  in consumption  per  capita.  Reductions 
in n, the labor  force growth  rate, would  have the opposite  effect, shifting 
the k  =  0 frontier  out. The steady-state  consumption  effect of a demo- 
graphic  shift such as a fertility decline, which reduces both a  and n, 
depends  on which of these effects may be larger.  Reductions  in n would 22  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1990 
unambiguously  reduce the optimal steady-state saving rate while in- 
creases in a would have no effect on steady-state  savings.20 
The actual demographic  projections  for the United States are more 
complex  than  an immediate  shift  in either  a  or n, however. For the next 
several decades, the net effect of demographic  change is an outward 
shift in the k =  0 locus, followed by a period of inward shift that 
terminates  with the locus below its current  level. When  consumers  have 
perfect  foresight  and recognize the complex nature  of the demographic 
transition,  the initial  consumption  response to news of the demographic 
transition  is theoretically  ambiguous. 
This ambiguity  suggests the need for explicit numerical  simulations 
to address  the optimal  consumption  response. We  assume  that  the utility 
function  in equation  9 has the form 
(13)  U(c,) =  (c,-  1/u  -  1)/(1  - 1/U), 
where  u is the elasticity  of substitution  in consumption.  We also assume 
a constant  elasticity of substitution  production  function: 
(14)  f(kt) =  [akt111-  +  b]1-P. 
The elasticity of substitution  in production  is P. To find the transition 
path between one steady state and another, we discretize differential 
equations  10  and 11  and  employ  a grid-search  algorithm  to find  the initial 
consumption  level that  will lead the economy to the new steady state.21 
Our  simulations  also allow for labor-augmenting  technical  change  (g) 
and depreciation  (s), which are introduced  into equations 10 and 11 in 
the standard  way.22  Although  consumption  grows over time when there 
is technical progress, the consumption  numbers  we report  are relative 
to the consumption  that  would have been possible without  demographic 
change. We assume that technical  change  is equal  to 1.4 percent  a year, 
the Social Security Administration's  steady-state  projection.23  The de- 
preciation  rate  is set equal  to 4.1 percent,  the U.S. average  during  1952- 
20. This is easily seen from  the Harrod-Domar  condition  k/fl k) = s/n, where  s is the 
saving rate out of national  income, and the observation  that neither  changes in (x nor 
changes  in n affect  optimal  steady-state  capital  intensity  in the Ramsey  model. 
21. Because the Social Security Administration  forecasts population  in every fifth 
year, we interpolate  annual  observations  using  a smooth  interpolator.  The results  are not 
sensitive  to the frequency  of the data. 
22. Following  Blanchard  and  Fischer  (1989),  we express  capital  per  "effective  worker," 
where  effective  workers  grow  at n + g. Consumption  is expressed  per  "effective  person." 
In equation  11,  the discount  factor  becomes  (p + 8 + g/l). 
23. Our  results  are  insensitive  to the choice of g. D.  M. Cutler, J. M. Poterba,  L. M.  Sheiner,  and L. H.  Summers  23 
87.24  Finally,  we use data  for this  period  on payments  to labor  and  capital 
to estimate  capital's  share  in gross output-33.2 percent.  Over  this same 
period,  the capital-output  ratio  averaged  2.3.25  These two numbers  imply 
a steady-state  marginal  product  of capital  of 14.4  percent.  From  equation 
11, this implies  an effective discount  rate (p + glu) of 10.3  percent:  that 
is, the steady-state  marginal  product  of capital  less depreciation. 
We present results using two values of u, a benchmark  case of unit 
elasticity (u =  1) and an alternative  elasticity of substitution  of one- 
tenth (u  =  0.1).  We also choose  two  values for the elasticity of 
substitution  in production,  a benchmark  of unit  elasticity  (,B  =  1)  and  an 
alternative elasticity of one-half (I  =  0.5).  When the elasticity of 
substitution  in consumption  is low, consumption  today is not a good 
substitute  for  consumption  tomorrow,  and  we expect more  consumption 
smoothing. When the elasticity of substitution  in production  is low, 
saving  does not  get a high  return  since  the extra  capital  does not substitute 
well for the smaller labor force,  and we  expect less  consumption 
smoothing. 
Demographic  change  has occurred  gradually  over the past 25 years, 
as the baby boom has given way to the baby bust. It is not obvious how 
best to model these changes as a single shock. Initially,  we assume the 
economy is in steady state with values of ot  and  n corresponding  to those 
prevailing  in 1990,  and ask how consumption  and saving should evolve 
henceforth.  Because some of the consequences of demographic  change 
were already known by 1990, we go on to examine how consumption 
and saving should have responded  in 1970  and 1980  if news of demo- 
graphic  change  had suddenly  arrived. 
For all our simulations,  we use the trajectories  of ox  and  n implied  by 
the Social Security  Administration's  alternative  Ilb forecasts, and fur- 
ther  assume  that the predicted  values for 2065  persist as the economy's 
final steady state.26  The resulting consumption changes are thus the 
24. Our  depreciation  rate is estimated  as capital  consumption  allowances  divided  by 
the aggregate  capital  stock. We define aggregate  capital  stock as national  assets minus 
consumer  durables  minus  one half of the value of land. Consumer  durables  are excluded 
since they are not included  in output.  One half of land  is included  in capital  to allow for 
natural  resource  values  to change. 
25. Capital's  share in output is total output less wages and salaries, two-thirds  of 
proprietors'  income (the estimated labor compensation),  and indirect  business taxes, 
divided  by output  less indirect  business  taxes. 
26. Alternative  IIb projections  embody  the alternative  II forecasts regarding  demo- 
graphic  change,  as well as an intermediate  set of economic  forecasts. 24  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1990 
Table 4.  Optimal Consumption Response to Demographic Shocks, 
United States,  1990-2060a 
Perfect  foresight with alternative  elasticitiesb 
Static  B =1  [  =1  [B =  0.5  B =  0.5 
Item  expectations  a  =1  u  =  0.1  =1  =I  =  0.1 
Case 1. Labor  force population  20-64 and unweighted  consumption 
Initial steady state  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Initial adjustment  100.0  100.6  101.1  100.4  101.0 
Time path 
2000  101.3  101.4  101.3  101.4  101.3 
2010  104.8  103.3  101.7  103.8  102.1 
2020  102.5  102.3  101.4  102.5  101.7 
2030  96.6  98.3  100.3  97.7  99.8 
2040  95.7  96.2  99.0  95.9  98.1 
2050  96.0  95.9  98.1  95.9  97.1 
2060  94.7  95.1  97.3  95.0  96.2 
New  steady  state  94.8  94.8  94.8  94.8  94.8 
Case 2. Earnings-weighted  labor  force and needs-weighted  consumption 
Initial steady state  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Initial adjustment  100.0  102.3  102.8  101.9  102.8 
Time path 
2000  105.4  104.1  103.0  104.5  103.3 
2010  104.9  104.1  102.8  104.5  103.0 
2020  99.4  100.4  101.5  100.2  101.1 
2030  94.0  95.7  99.6  95.0  98.3 
2040  93.0  93.5  97.8  93.2  96.0 
2050  92.5  92.7  96.3  92.6  94.5 
2060  91.7  92.0  95.1  91.8  93.4 
New  steady  state  91.6  91.6  91.6  91.6  91.6 
Source: Authors'  calculations. 
a. Each column  is the simulated  path of consumption  in response  to a demographic  shock like that which the 
United  States will experience  between 1990  and 2060.  The static  expectations  column  is the change  in consumption 
if agents  in each period  assume  that  the current  level of ot  and it will persist  forever.  The perfect  foresight  columns 
assume  current  knowledge  of the entire  path  of demographic  change.  The initial  steady  state is the 1990  value of at 
and  n. 
b. ,B  is the substitution  elasticity  in production;  a is the substitution  elasticity  in consumption. 
optimal  response to the demographic  transition  that the United States 
will undergo  over the next seven decades, assuming  these changes  were 
unforeseen  as of 1990. 
The results  of these simulations  are shown  in table  4. The level of per 
capita consumption  in the 1990  steady state is normalized  to 100. The 
first  column,  the static  expectations  response, is the change  in consump- D.  M.  Cutler, J.  M. Poterba,  L. M. Sheiner,  and L. H.  Summers  25 
tion  if consumers  have no foresight  about  demographic  change  but  rather 
assume at each date that current  conditions  will persist forever. It thus 
corresponds  to the consumption  path  in table 3. The other  four columns 
assume that consumers  in 1990  have perfect foresight  regarding  future 
demographic  changes. 
For all the parameter  values, consumption  rises initially  in response 
to the demographic  transition,  by up to 2.8 percent  relative  to the steady 
state implied by  1990 demography. This result is insensitive to the 
parameter  choices we present.27  Consumption  remains  above its 1990 
level until 2020 or later. Thus, demographic  shifts during  the next half- 
century  optimally  raise  present consumption.  The initial  effect is more 
pronounced  when  consumption  is less substitutable  over  time  (a is small) 
and  less pronounced  when production  is less substitutable  over time ( 
is small). 
Figure 7 shows the movements of consumption  and capital for the 
simulations using unit elasticities of  substitution in production and 
consumption. The corresponding saving rate is  shown in figure 8. 
Consumption  initially  rises by 2.3 percent. This is followed by a period 
when capital  per effective worker  declines, during  which consumption 
continues  to increase. The shifting  opportunity  locus due to the decline 
in labor  force growth  ultimately  causes an increase  in saving  and  thus in 
capital intensity, even at the higher level of consumption. After the 
period of capital deepening, consumption  begins to decline. Finally, 
when the increase  in dependency  overtakes  the favorable  effects of the 
slowing  labor  force growth,  both consumption  and  capital  decline  to the 
new steady state, and saving  remains  low. 
As figure  8 demonstrates,  the saving rate falls almost 2 percentage 
points during  the 1990 initial adjustment.  It then increases for a few 
years, though  it never attains  its initial  steady-state  value. This increase 
is due  to the  increase  in the support  ratio,  which  allows  both  consumption 
per  person  and  the saving  rate  to increase.  Finally,  the saving  rate  begins 
to fall toward its new long-run  level, equal to the amount of saving 
necessary  to equip  the more slowly growing  labor  force. 
We  also  ran  the simulations  using  the Social  Security  Administration's 
alternative  I and  alternative  III, with no substantive  changes  in results. 
27. In  addition  to  the  parameter  values  reported,  we have  experimented  with  elasticities 
in substitution  and  production  up to 10.  For none of these cases is there  an initial  increase 
in savings. 26  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1990 
Figure 7.  Optimal Consumption and Capital-Labor Trajectory Following Demographic 
Shock,  1990-2060 
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Source:  Authors'  calculations.  Elasticities  used are ,  = 1, a=  1. Labor force  measure is earnings-weighted  (LF2); 
consumption  measure  is needs-weighted  (CON2).  Consumption  at the initial steady  state is normalized  to  100. The 
resulting index yields  capital per effective  worker equal to 274 in the initial steady  state. 
Consumption  rises less with the alternative  I assumptions  than  with our 
benchmark  alternative  II  assumptions,  because  the number  of dependent 
children  does not decrease as quickly, and more  with the alternative  III 
assumptions,  where  there  is an even larger  short-run  benefit.  In all three 
cases the response  to the demographic  news is a decrease  in saving. We 
have also experimented  with changing  capital's share or the assumed 
initial  level of capital  intensity  in order  to vary  the discount  rate  '8  Even 
with  a pure  discount  rate  as low as zero, our  conclusion  that  consumption 
rises following  a demographic  shock remains  valid. 
Finally,  we explored  how consumption  would change  if we began  the 
simulations  in 1970 or 1980. As table 2 demonstrated, consumption 
28. Because the discount  factor  must  equal  the marginal  product  of capital  in steady 
state, and the marginal  product  of capital  is the ratio of capital's share  in output  to the 
capital-output  ratio,  changes  in the discount  factor  have  to be accompanied  by changes  in 
either  capital's  share  or the capital-output  ratio. D.  M.  Cutler, J. M. Poterba,  L. M. Sheiner,  and L. H.  Summers  27 
Figure 8.  Optimal Saving Rates in Response to Demographic Shock,  1990-2070 
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Source:  Authors'  calculations.  Elasticities  used  are  ,  = 1,  a=  1. The  consumption  measure  is  needs-weighted 
(CON2); the labor force  measure is earnings-weighted  (LF2). 
possibilities  are  higher  in 1990  than  in any of the three  previous  decades. 
Figure  9 shows the deviation of the saving rate from its initial steady- 
state level after  the demographic  news. In all of the simulations,  saving 
falls immediately  following  the demographic  news, and  is always falling 
by 2000.  Even in the cases where saving  begins  to increase  in the 1990s- 
when we begin  the simulation  in 1980  or 1990-the  saving  rate is lower 
throughout  the 1990s  than  the original  steady state, and  it begins  a period 
of prolonged  decline  by 2000. 
While  these figures  help to develop perspective  on the recent decline 
in U.S. saving  and investment  rates, the actual  decline in U.S. national 
saving  from  an average  of 7.1 percent  in the 1970s  to about 2 percent in 
the late 1980s  is considerably  more than our demographic  analysis can 
justify. 
The  analysis  in  this  section  reaches  a clear  conclusion.  For  an  economy 
choosing  its consumption  path  in accord  with a standard  optimal  growth 
model, the right response to the upcoming  U.S. demographic  change 28  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1990 
Figure 9.  Optimal Saving Responses to Demographic Change: Sensitivity to Date 
of Demographic Discoverya 
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Source: Authors'  calculations  using Board of Trustees of the Federal  Old-Age  and Survivors  Insurance  and 
Disability  Insurance Trust Funds (1988). 
a. This figure  presents  the percentage  point difference  in saving rates from the initial  steady state following  a 
demographic  shock.  The  three  lines  represent  saving  paths  when  the  simulations  are  run  starting  in  1970,  1980,  and 
1990. These saving plcuations  u  sinBardof  n  Tusg  needs-weighted  consumption  (CON2)  and the earnings- 
weighted  labor  force (LF2),  and  unit  elasticities  of substitution  in both production  and  consumption  (, = 1, a= 1). 
would  be an increase  in consumption  and  a reduction  in national  saving. 
For  all  plausible  combinations  of parameter  values, the  effects of reduced 
labor  force growth  and  reductions  in the number  of children  exceed the 
effects of increases  in long-run  dependency. 
Open-Economy  Aspects of the Demographic Shift 
Our  analysis thus far has focused on the demographic  change in the 
United States. When capital markets are integrated, however, the 
demographic  shift in the United States must be measured  not only in 
absolute  terms but relative  to the coincident shifts in our major  trading 
partners. This section compares the degree of population aging in D.  M.  Cutler, J. M. Poterba,  L. M.  Sheiner,  and L. H.  Summers  29 
different  nations and extends our earlier  simulation  model to consider 
the United States in relation  to the other countries  in the Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Our earlier 
finding  that, other things being equal, demographic  changes justify a 
reduction  in optimal  saving  is reinforced  when we allow  for  international 
capital flows, because demographic  change is less pronounced  in the 
United States than  elsewhere in the OECD. 
Relative Rates of Population Aging 
To compare rates of population aging, we use projections by the 
OECD.29  These projections  differ  in two important  ways from  the Social 
Security Administration  projections for the United States. First, the 
OECD treats the 15-19 age group as workers rather  than dependents. 
Second, and more important,  the OECD assumes that fertility  rates in 
all countries will converge to the replacement level of 2.1 by 2050. 
Because U.S. fertility  rates  are currently  well above those in most of the 
OECD, this understates  the likely contrast  between the future  U.S. and 
foreign  demographic  experiences. 
Figure  10  shows the historical  and  projected  elderly  dependency  ratio 
for the United States, Japan, and the European Community.30  The 
elderly dependency ratio increases substantially  in all countries, with 
the most rapid  increase in Japan. By 2050, even with a 19 percentage 
point  increase  in the elderly  dependency  ratio  from 1950,  the U.S. ratio 
will be roughly 5 percentage points lower than those of the other 
countries. 
Figure 11 shows the path of support  ratios corresponding  to the LF1 
and CON1 assumptions. The broad outlines for all three regions are 
similar.  All have higher  support  ratios in 1990  than in 1960,  and all will 
have much  lower support  ratios by the middle  of the next century  than 
they do today. The ultimate  level of U.S. dependency  will  be lower than 
that  abroad. 
Two differences in these indexes are notable, however. First, the 
United States will be better off for the next two decades than  it is now, 
while the other countries experience declines in the support ratio 
29. OECD  (1988). 
30. The  multicountry  index  is a GDP-weighted  average  of the  indexes  for  the  individual 
countries. 30  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1990 
Figure 10.  Actual and Projected Elderly Dependency Ratios, United States, Japan, 




38  - 
36- 
34- 
32  Japat  - 
30  -  . 
24~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~J 
22  t  Eulopean  Commruni/y  ........./.  t 
18  _  Unite  States 
14  -  -J 
122/ 
10 
I  I  I  I  I  I  I  II 
1950  1970  1990  2010  2030  2050 
Year 
Source:  OECD (1988). Working-age population includes  all those  aged  15-64. 
beginning in 1990. Second, the U.S.  and EC dependency ratios are 
driven  principally  by fertility  changes, while the Japanese  changes are 
driven  to a much  larger  extent by reductions  in mortality.31  The decline 
in the support  ratio  in the 1950s  in the United States and in the 1960s  in 
the EC is due to increased  numbers  of children;  the rise in the support 
ratio throughout  the postwar  period  in Japan,  in contrast, is caused by 
reduced mortality  at middle and older ages. Because the labor force 
grows faster  when fertility  is higher,  the reduction  in labor  force growth 
over the next several  decades, and thus the consumption  dividend  from 
reduced  investment  requirements,  will be larger  in the United  States and 
the European  Community  than  in Japan. 
To evaluate the size of the demographic  transition  abroad, table 5 
reports the optimal consumption and saving responses to projected 
31. OECD  (1988)  presents  evidence  on  the  importance  offertility  and  mortality  declines 
for the different  countries. D.  M.  Cutler, J. M. Poterba,  L. M. Sheiner,  and L. H.  Summers  31 
Figure 11.  Actual and Projected Support Ratios, United States, Japan, and European 
Community, 1950-2050 
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32. The table uses the case of unit elasticities of substitution  and production.  We 
assume  that  depreciation  rates  and  rates  of labor-augmenting  technical  progress  are  equal 
in all countries  and are the same as the Social Security  Administration  forecasts  for the 
United States. The assumption  of equal productivity  growth is obviously wrong but 
probably  does not have  a large  impact  on estimates  of the change  in saving  due to changes 
in demographic  structure. 32  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1990 
Table 5.  Autarky Response of Consumption and Saving to Demographic Shocks, 
United States and Various Nations, 1990-2050a 
Country 
United  European  Non-U.S.  Total 
Item  States  Japan  Community  OECD  OECD 
Consumnption  response 
Initial steady state  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Initial adjustment  100.1  99.2  100.1  100.0  100.1 
Time path 
2000  100.6  97.2  99.7  99.3  99.8 
2010  101.5  92.2  98.8  97.8  99.2 
2020  99.1  89.0  97.1  95.5  97.0 
2030  94.4  88.5  92.8  92.1  93.0 
2040  92.0  86.3  89.1  88.8  89.9 
2050  92.1  84.8  88.2  87.9  89.1 
New  steady  state  92.3  84.4  87.9  87.8  89.0 
Saving rate response 
Initial adjustment  -0.1  0.7  -0.1  0.0  0.0 
Time path 
2000  0.1  -  1.4  -0.9  -  1.0  -  0.6 
2010  0.5  -  3.0  -0.7  -  1.1  -0.5 
2020  -  1.4  -  2.6  -1.5  -1.8  -  1.6 
2030  -2.4  -  1.3  -2.8  -2.5  -2.5 
2040  -  1.5  -3.1  -2.9  -2.9  -2.3 
2050  -  1.4  -  1.5  -0.8  -1.2  -  1.3 
New  steady  state  -  1.5  -  1.3  -0.7  -  1.1  -  1.3 
Source:  OECD (1988) and authors' calculations. 
a.  The  values  in the table are the optimal consumption  and saving  paths for each  country  without  international 
capital flows.  We use  needs-weighted  consumption  (CON2)  and the unweighted  labor force  (LF1).  Consumption  is 
relative  to  the  initial  steady  state,  which  is  normalized  to  100. Saving  paths  are defined  as  the  percentage  point 
difference  between  the  saving  rate  along  the  path  and the  initial  steady  state.  The  elasticities  of  substitution  in 
production and consumption  both equal unity. 
sumption  initially  by just under 1 percent, and consumption  continues 
to decline  throughout  the next 60 years, even as the saving  rate  declines. 
For the European Community,  there is also a slight increase in con- 
sumption,  but by 2000 consumption  is lower, and continues to decline 
throughout  the next half-century.  This pattern  of declining  consumption 
after  a small  increase  in initial  consumption  carries  over to the non-U.  S. 
OECD  and  total OECD simulations. 
The initial decrease in the saving rate in the United States and the 
increase  in the non-U.S. OECD  imply  that in an open economy, capital 
would  initially  flow  from  the non-U.S. OECD  to the United  States. After 
the initial  change  in saving, however, capital  flows are more difficult  to D.  M.  Cutler, J. M. Poterba,  L. M. Sheiner,  and L. H.  Summers  33 
predict.  In addition  to the change  in saving  rates  in the autarky  case, the 
countries  also have different  changes in labor force growth rates, and 
thus in investment requirements.  Because the desired capital inflow 
depends  on the difference  between saving  and  investment  requirements, 
looking  at saving  rates or consumption  alone does not indicate  whether 
each country  would  borrow  or lend. To address  this issue, we turn  next 
to simulations  that  allow for capital  mobility. 
A Two-Country  Simulation  Model 
Our  open-economy  simulations  aggregate  the European  Community, 
Japan,  and the other countries  of the OECD to form a non-U.S. OECD 
index. Figures 12 and 13 show the support  ratio  and labor  force growth 
rates for the United States and this aggregate.  The support  ratios are 
consistent  with those in figure  11. The United States has a 5 percentage 
point  higher  support  ratio  in 2050  than  the non-U.S. OECD, and unlike 
the  rest  of the OECD  has  a rising  support  ratio  over the next two decades. 
By 2050  the labor  force in both areas is projected  to stabilize, not grow. 
Between now and then they fluctuate,  but with U.S. labor  force growth 
always  higher. 
To assess the optimal  response of U.S. saving in an open-economy 
context, we extend the model  of the previous  section to allow  for capital 
mobility  . We distinguish  asset ownership  from  asset location  by denoting 
period  t asset ownership  per person in country 1 by a1  t. Asset accumu- 
lation  is given by 
(15)  a1,t =  wt +  a1,t  (rt -  ni,t) -(cl,t1o,), 
where the wage, wt, and the interest rate, rt, are equalized across 
countries.  The labor  force growth  rate, the support  ratio, and the level 
of per  capita  consumption  can differ  across countries  and  therefore  have 
both  time  and  country  subscripts. 
The  common  capital-labor  ratio  is a weighted  average  of asset holdings 
in the two nations: 
(16)  kt =  01t  a1,t  +  (1 -  01,t)  a2 t, 
where 01,t  is country I's share of world population. From equation 16 we 
derive  the capital  accumulation  constraint  for the two-country  model: 
(17)  k,  = 61,t (a1,t  -  a2,t)  +  01,t bl,t  +  (I  01,t)  a2,t 34  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1990 
Figure 12.  Actual and Projected Support Ratios, United States and Non-U.S. 
OECD,  1960-2050 
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Source:  Authors'  calculations  based  on  data  in  OECD  (1988).  Non-U.S.  OECD  includes  all  OECD  countries 
except  the  United  States,  weighted  by GDP.  The  consumption  measure  is needs-weighted  (CON2),  with the same 
weights  as for the United  States.  The labor force  is the population  15-64 (LF1). 
This constraint replaces equation 10 in the one-country model. The 
optimal  consumption  profile  (equation 11)  and the steady-state saving- 
investment  relation  (equation  12)  are  identical  to those in  the one-country 
case. 
We calibrate  the two-country  model assuming that both countries 
have Cobb-Douglas  production  functions and logarithmic  utility func- 
tions. We assume that one nation  is the United States and the other is 
the non-U.S. OECD,  and  set the relative  labor  force in the United States 
at four-tenths  of the two-country  total, roughly  the value of the produc- 
tivity-weighted  U.S. labor force share for 1990. In addition, we begin 
the simulations  assuming  no net foreign  investment  position.33  We also 
assume  equal  rates  of technological  progress  and  equal  discount  rates  in 
the two countries. 
33. This corresponds  to the average  U.S. net foreign  asset position  during  the 1980s, 
but  understates  foreign  holdings  of U.S. assets at the beginning  of the 1990s. D.  M.  Cutler, J. M. Poterba,  L. M. Sheiner,  and L. H.  Summers  35 
Figure 13.  Actual and Projected Growth Rate of Labor Force, United States 
and Non-U.S.  OECD, 1960-2050 
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Source: Same  as figure  12. 
Table 6 presents the two-country simulation  results. We normalize 
consumption  to be 100  initially  in both countries. While  the shape  of the 
consumption  response  is similar  in the open-  and  closed-economy  cases, 
the size of the responses is different.  For the United States, the closed- 
economy analysis suggests a 0.1 percent  consumption  increase relative 
to the 1990  steady  state. With  capital  flows between the relatively  slowly 
aging United States and the more rapidly aging rest of the OECD, 
however, the U.S.  consumption increase is  1 percent of the  1990 
benchmark.  Consumption  in the United States increases more in the 
open-economy  case because high  saving  elsewhere  in the world  reduces 
the rate of return  to capital, inducing  a positive shock to the value of 
human  wealth.34 
34. Although  we assume  that utility  is logarithmic,  the interest  elasticity  of saving  is 
positive. When interest rates increase, holding  wealth constant, saving is unaffected. 
However, with interest rates higher, the present discounted value of labor income 
decreases,  and  hence consumption  falls. Wages  in the United States also increase  in the 
short  run. 36  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1.1990 
Table 6.  Effect of Demographic Shock on Consumption and Foreign Capital Ownership, 
United States and Non-U.S.  OECD,  1990-2050a 
United  States  Non-U.S. OECD 
Foreign  Foreign 
capital  capital 
Consump-  ownership  Consump-  ownership 
Item  tion  (percent)  tion  (percent) 
Initial steady  state  100.0  0.0  100.0  0.0 
Initial adjustment  101.0  0.0  99.4  0.0 
Time path 
2000  100.8  -  5.5  99.2  3.7 
2010  100.2  -  6.4  98.7  4.7 
2020  97.9  -  3.5  96.4  2.6 
2030  93.9  -4.7  92.4  3.7 
2040  91.0  -7.9  89.6  6.7 
2050  90.5  -  8.7  89.1  7.7 
New  steady  state  90.5  -8.7  89.1  7.7 
Source: OECD  (1988)  and  authors'  calculations. 
a. The table shows the results from the open-economy  demographic  simulation.  We use the needs-weighted 
measure  for consumption  (CON2)  and the unweighted  labor  force (LFI). Consumption  is normalized  to 100  in the 
initial  steady state. Foreign  capital  ownership  is the percentage  of assets in each country  owned  by foreigners.  It is 
initially  zero in both  countries.  The elasticities  of substitution  in production  and consumption  both  equal  unity. 
To finance  the additional  consumption  indicated  in the simulations, 
the United States runs a current  account deficit. Figure 14 shows the 
path of net national saving and net investment, and, as residual, the 
current account. For about 15 years, the United States runs current 
account deficits, so that more than 6 percent of U.S. assets are owned 
by foreigners  in 2010. High saving  for the subsequent  15  years results in 
current  account surpluses  and reduces foreign  capital  ownership  to 3.5 
percent. Past 2020, however, with the rapid  increase in the number  of 
elderly, the United States again  runs  current  account deficits, so that in 
the steady  state  almost  9 percent  of U.S. assets are  owned  by foreigners. 
For the non-U.S. OECD, consumption  declines 0.6 percent when 
trade  with the United States is permitted.  The availability  of investment 
projects in the United States means that higher saving in the short run 
will not depress rates of return  by as much as in the closed-economy 
case. 
The open- and closed-economy cases yield different consumption 
levels in both the short  run and the steady state. In the open-economy D.  M.  Cutler, J.  M. Poterba,  L. M. Sheiner,  and L. H.  Summers  37 
Figure 14.  Net Saving and Investment Rates, United States, from Two-Country 
Simulations, 1990-2050 
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Source:  Authors' calculations  and OECD (1988). 
case, U.S.  consumption  is higher in the early stage of the transition 
because of the availability  of foreign capital. The resulting  decrease in 
asset accumulation  translates  into a 1.8 percentage  point reduction  in 
steady-state  consumption  from  the closed-economy simulation.  For the 
non-U.S. OECD, the effect is reversed: greater capital accumulation 
along  the transition  path leads to steady-state  consumption  1.3 percen- 
tage points  higher  than  in the autarky  steady state. 
These results suggest two conclusions. First, the pattern of demo- 
graphic  change  in other  developed nations  can have a large  effect on the 
optimal consumption  response to demographic  change in the United 
States. The importance  of these effects depends  critically  on the degree 
of capital  market  integration.  Second, because the United States is aging 
more slowly than other OECD nations, the optimal consumption  re- 
sponse in the open economy entails higher  initial consumption  than in 
the autarky  case and  thus a current  account  deficit. 38  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1990 
Demographic  Change and Productivity Growth 
The foregoing  calculations  assume that demographic  changes affect 
productivity  only by causing changes in capital intensity. The rate of 
technical  change,  or equivalently  of total  factor  productivity,  is assumed 
to be independent  of demographic  developments. But if demographic 
factors affect technical change, the implications  could be quite signifi- 
cant, both for living standards  and  for optimal  capital  accumulation. 
There  are several  potential  links  between  demographic  developments 
and the rate of technological  change. One argument,  stressed recently 
by Julian  Simon  and  Ben Wattenberg,  holds  that  slow population  growth 
reduces the rate of technical  progress.35  The argument  has two strands. 
First, a rapidly  growing  population  enlarges  the market  for capital  goods 
(the Solow effect noted above), making  innovation  more profitable  by 
permitting  greater  spreading  of fixed  costs. As population  growth  slows, 
innovation  becomes less profitable.  Second, as the share  of the popula- 
tion that is young and innovates declines, the aging society loses some 
of its "dynamism" and experiences slower technical change. As de- 
scribed  by French  demographer  Alfred  Sauvy, such a future  would hold 
"a society of old people, living in old houses, ruminating  about old 
ideas.  "36 
A more optimistic argument,  advanced by H. J. Habakkuk,  is that 
incentives to innovate are strongest  when labor is scarce.37  Habakkuk 
argued  that  industrialization  proceeded  faster  in  America  than  in  England 
because attractive  agricultural  opportunities  raised  the price of labor  in 
the United States relative  to that in England,  where labor  was abundant 
and less expensive. Paul Romer  has formalized  this argument  and used 
it to explain  the apparent  tendency  for abnormally  rapid  U.S. productiv- 
ity growth  in periods  of relatively  slow labor  force growth.38 
The relative importance  of these mechanisms  can only be assessed 
empirically.  Unfortunately,  there are no ideal experiments  for consid- 
ering  the effects of demographic  change  on productivity  growth. Below 
we draw on the differing  demographic  experiences of relatively high- 
35. Simon  (1981)  and  Wattenberg  (1987). 
36. Wattenberg  (1987,  p. 65). 
37. Habakkuk  (1962). 
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income countries  to assess the likelihood  that an aging  population  will 
lead to economic stagnation. 
Evidence on Productivity  and Demographic Composition 
Our  empirical  work uses the 1960-85 international  comparison  data 
of Robert Summers  and Alan Heston.39  Unfortunately,  data on total 
factor productivity  are not available for a wide sample of countries. 
Instead, we study the relation between labor force growth and labor 
productivity  growth.40 
We selected countries  with 1960  labor  productivity  at least 30 percent 
of U.S.  productivity  (we use income per worker as our productivity 
measure)  and excluded the OPEC countries, thus generating  a sample 
of 29 countries. Selecting on initial  income avoids the bias of including 
only countries that have experienced large productivity growth, as 
Bradford  DeLong highlights.41  We omit countries with very low initial 
productivity  because the role of labor  force growth  may  be very different 
in pre-industrial  societies. Japan  is omitted  because its productivity  was 
only 25 percent  of U.S. productivity  in 1960. 
Figure 15 plots annual  productivity  growth and annual  labor force 
growth during 1960-85. The data show a strong negative correlation. 
Slower-growing  countries, including most European nations, exhibit 
above-average  productivity  growth, while more rapidly  growing  coun- 
tries such as Canada  and  Australia  have lower productivity  growth. 
To control  for additional  factors affecting  growth,  we estimate  cross- 
section  regressions  of the form: 
(18)  ln (yj1/y0j)1T  =  o0 +  al ln (LFj,j/LF0,j)/T 
+  (X2 ln (yo,i)  + (X3 (I Y)i  +  Ei, 
where  yl  i and  yo, are, respectively,  final  and  initial  output  per  labor  force 
member;  LF1,j  and LF0,j  are the final  and initial  labor  force; (I/Y)i  is the 
average  investment  rate  during  the sample  period;  i denotes the country; 
and T  is the length  of the sample  period.  The investment  rate  is included 
to control  for changes in capital that affect labor productivity  but not 
39. Summers  and  Heston  (1990). 
40. We present  limited  evidence below suggesting  that the difference  between labor 
productivity  and  total  factor  productivity  does not have a large  effect on our  results. 
41. DeLong  (1988). 40  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1990 
Figure 15.  Productivity Growth and Labor Force Growth, Selected Countries,  1960-85a 
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Source:  Authors'  calculations  based on data in Summers and Heston  (1990). The G-7 countries  are labeled on the 
figure. 
a.  Japan is included in the figure but not in the regression  line. 
total factor productivity. Initial income is  included to  capture the 
possibility that lagging  countries grow more rapidly  as they converge 
toward leading ones. Productivity  growth and labor force growth are 
expressed  at annual  rates. 
The upper  panel  of table  7 reports  ordinary  least squares  estimates  of 
equation 18. The coefficients in the bivariate  regressions, analogous  to 
figure 15, imply that a 1 percentage  point decrease in the annual  labor 
force growth  rate raises productivity  growth  by 0.62 percentage  point a 
year. Controlling  for  the initial  level of productivity  and  investment  rates 
has little effect on the labor  force growth  coefficient, with the estimates 
still negative (-0.64)  and large. The data also suggest that more rapid 
investment leads to faster productivity  growth, although there is no 
evidence of productivity  convergence  for this sample. 
We estimated equation 18 with other samples of countries, with 
similar  results. If we include  the six OPEC  countries  with 1960  produc- D.  M. Cutler, J. M. Poterba,  L. M.  Sheiner,  and L. H.  Summers  41 
Table 7.  Demographic Change and Productivity Growth,  1960-85,  Various Periodsa 
No controls  With  controls 
Logarithm 
Labor  force  _  Laborforce  of initial  Investment 
Period  growth  R  growth  produictivity  rate  R 
Ordinary  least squares  estimates 
1960-85  -0.617  0.281  -0.637  -0.346  0.063  0.421 
(0.179)  (0.161)  (0.434)  (0.022) 
1960-73  -  1.061  0.389  -1.044  -0.730  0.064  0.460 
(0.245)  (0.232)  (0.647)  (0.028) 
1973-85  - 0.258  0.025  -0.295  0.154  0.075  0.175 
(0.198)  (0.195)  (0.546)  (0.031) 
Fixed effects  -0.903  0.085  -0.446  -6.290  0.032  0.600 
(0.477)  (0.355)  (1.177)  (0.057) 
Instrumental  variables  estimates 
1960-85  -0.711  ...  -0.742  -0.337  0.064 
(0.216)  (0.189)  (0.438)  (0.022) 
1960-73  - 0.977  . ..  - 0.956  - 0.763  0.064 
(0.297)  (0.272)  (0.651)  (0.028) 
1973-85  - 0.436  ...  -0.610  -0.150  0.085  ... 
(0.272)  (0.296)  (0.610)  (0.033) 
Fixed effects  - 0.840  . . .  0.332  -7.273  -0.017 
(1.151)  (1.440)  (2.174)  (0.107) 
Source:  Authors'  calculations  based  on data  in Summers  and  Heston  (1990). 
a. The dependent  variable  is the annual  productivity  growth  rate.  The labor  force  growth  rate  and  investment  rate 
are both annual  rates. The sample  consists of the 29 non-OPEC  countries  with 1960  income  per worker  above 30 
percent  of the U.S. level. The upper  panel  reports  ordinary  least squares  estimates.  The lower  panel  instruments  for 
the growth  rate of the labor  force with the growth  rate of the population.  Standard  errors  are in parentheses;  R2s 
are adjusted  for degrees  of freedom. 
tivity  above  30  percent  of the U. S. level, the  coefficient  in  the  multivariate 
regression  rises to -0.517  (0.144). If we limit the sample to countries 
with 1960  productivity  at least 50 percent of that in the United States, 
the coefficient becomes  -0.263  (0.192). If we consider the current 
OECD  countries,  the coefficient  is - 0.372  (0.161).  Finally,  if we include 
all 114  countries  in the Summers  and Heston data  with at least 20 years 
of data, the coefficient becomes  -  0.507 (0.159). 
Dividing  the period 1960-85 into two shorter  intervals, 1960-73 and 
1973-85,  shown in the second and third  rows of the upper  panel, allows 
us to examine  the importance  of the productivity  slowdown  in the mid- 
1970s.  The results  from  these regressions  are  consistent  with those from 
the full sample,  although  the evidence is stronger  in the 1960-73  period. 
In the earlier  period, the coefficient (-  1.044) is much larger  and still 
statistically  significantly  different  from zero. In the post-1973  period, 
the coefficient  falls to - 0.295 and is no longer  statistically  significant. 42  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1990 
The fourth row of the table presents the results of treating  the two 
sample  periods  as a panel  and  estimating  a fixed-effects  regression.  This 
specification  controls  for other  factors  that  can explain  persistent  differ- 
ences in growth  rates across countries  but that are not included  in our 
set of explanatory  variables.  The  results  are  qualitatively  similar  to those 
without the fixed effects. The coefficient  in the multivariate  regression 
(-  0.446)  is within  the range  of the estimates  for the two sample  periods, 
although  the coefficient is not statistically significantly  different  from 
zero when we control  for initial  income and  the investment  rate. 
The lower panel  of the table  reports  instrumental  variables  estimates 
of the same  equations,  using  the population  growth  rate  as an instrument 
for labor  force growth. If rapid  productivity  growth  leads to less rapid 
increases in labor force participation,  the ordinary  least squares esti- 
mates  will be biased, but  the instrumental  variables  regressions  will not. 
The instrumental  variables  estimates  strongly  confirm  the ordinary  least 
squares estimates. In the 1960-85 regression, the coefficient on labor 
force growth becomes more negative in the instrumental  variables 
regression  ( - 0.742) and is still statistically  significant.  The coefficients 
on the other  variables,  in contrast,  change  little. 
As the second and third rows of the bottom panel suggest, this is 
principally  due to a more pronounced  negative relation  between labor 
force growth  and  productivity  growth  during  1973-85.  This is consistent 
with Richard  Freeman's  claim  that  the decline in productivity  growth  in 
post-1973 Europe discouraged  labor force participation,  leading to a 
positive bias in the coefficient  on labor  force growth  rates.42 
The final row presents the results for the instrumental  variables 
regression  with the fixed-effects specification.  While the coefficient in 
the bivariate  regression  is similar  to the ordinary  least squares  estimate, 
the coefficient  in the multivariate  regression  is positive. In both cases, 
the coefficients  on labor  force growth  are not statistically  different  from 
zero. 
Because reductions  in the labor force growth rate tend to increase 
capital  intensity,  one would  expect them  to be associated  with increases 
in labor productivity  growth even if they had no impact on technical 
change.43  We doubt  that  the equations  in table  7 are  primarily  picking  up 
42. Freeman  (1988). 
43. Mankiw,  Romer,  and  Weil  (1990)  explore  this possibility  with particular  attention 
to the role of human  capital  accumulation. D.  M. Cutler, J.  M. Poterba,  L. M. Sheiner,  and L. H.  Summers  43 
this effect for two reasons. First, its theoretical magnitude  is much 
smaller  than  the effects implied  by the cross-country  equations.  Over a 
25-year period, a 1 percentage point reduction in labor force growth 
holding  the saving rate constant would raise labor productivity  by at 
most 0.17 percentage  point assuming  a Cobb-Douglas  production  func- 
tion  with  a 67 percent  labor  share." Second, for a small  sample  of OECD 
countries  with available  data (18 countries)  we estimated productivity 
growth  equations  using  both labor  productivity  and total factor  produc- 
tivity and  found  only negligible  differences  in the results.45 
These regressions imply substantively  large effects of demographic 
change  on future  growth. Because the annual  labor  force growth  rate is 
predicted  to fall by about 1 percentage  point between 1990 and 2050, 
with  most of the change  occurring  between 1990  and  2010,  our  estimates 
imply an increase of about 0.6 percentage  point in annual  productivity 
growth. Such effects are large enough to offset the decline in living 
standards  that  we presented  above. Even a 0.2 percentage  point  increase 
in annual  productivity  growth  between 1990  and 2040 would offset the 
roughly 10 percent decrease in per capita consumption  as a result of 
rising dependency burdens  over that period. Thus, even if the effects 
are  much  smaller  than  those from  our  regressions,  they are  likely  to have 
a large  impact  on future  living standards. 
The  regressions  thus  far  present  little  evidence  for  the  more  pessimistic 
view of demographic  change. It may be, however, that  part  of the effect 
of demographic  change occurs through  the investment rate. If slower 
labor  force growth  reduces the rate of innovation  because of decreased 
demand for capital goods, that will show up as a positive effect of 
investment  rates  on productivity  growth,  rather  than  as an  effect of labor 
force growth. 
To consider  this hypothesis, we reestimated  the equations  in table 7 
without  controlling  for the rate of investment. The results change little 
from  those  reported.  For  the  full  time  period,  for  example,  the coefficient 
44. The predicted  effect is this large  only if the base year for our observations  (1960) 
is the first  year  of the new labor  force  growth  rates.  If the countries  were  already  in steady 
state with different  labor force growth rates, there would be no predicted  effect on 
productivity  from  this explanation. 
45. Without  controls  for initial  productivity  and investment  rates, the coefficient  on 
the growth  rate  of the labor  force is - 0.788 (0.207)  in the equation  for labor  productivity 
and - 0.696 (0.257) in the equation for total factor productivity.  In the multivariate 
regression,  the coefficients  are - 0.305  (0.216)  and - 0.259  (0.324)  in the two equations. 44  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1990 
on labor  force growth  falls only slightly,  from - 0.637 (0.161)  to - 0.617 
(0.182). In no case  does the coefficient on labor force growth fall 
substantially,  and in many  cases it becomes more  important. 
It is also possible that our measure  of demographic  change  is not the 
best measure  for examining  the productivity  consequences of changes 
in the population  structure.  The argument  that  older  work  forces are  less 
innovative  than  their  younger  counterparts  suggests that a variable  like 
the average  age  of the  work  force  is a more  direct  measure  of demographic 
conditions. Our measure of labor force growth rates is only partly 
correlated  with this type of demographic  variable. 
We explored this possibility by adding  the average age of the labor 
force to the equations  in table 7.46  In the basic specification  in the first 
row  of the table,  when  the  average  age variable  is included,  the coefficient 
on the labor force growth  rate declines to - 0.483 (0.225), and that on 
the average labor  force age is 0.135 (0.138). Neither the coefficient on 
initial  productivity  nor  that  on the investment  rate  changes  substantially. 
Similar  conclusions  emerge  for the other specifications.47 
To the  extent  that  the labor  scarcity  hypothesis  is correct,  it reinforces 
our conclusion that the maturing  of the labor force expands society's 
opportunities.  Faster  productivity  growth  has a theoretically  ambiguous 
effect on the level of current  consumption,  however. It tends to increase 
consumption  today because of the income effect of increased output, 
but this effect can be offset by a substitution  effect from the increased 
investment  return  as the effective supply  of labor  grows more quickly. 
To evaluate these effects for current consumption decisions, we 
calculated the optimal consumption path when productivity growth 
changes over time. We assumed  that each percentage  point decrease in 
labor force growth increases productivity growth by 0.5 percentage 
point, a number  in the range of those in table 7. Figure 16 shows the 
resulting  consumption  path,  as well as the consumption  path  without  the 
46. To account  for changes  in the average  age of the labor  force over the time period 
of our productivity  growth  measurements,  we defined  the average  labor  force age over 
any period  as the mean  of the average  age at the endpoints  of the period. 
47. We intend  to explore  these issues further  in subsequent  work.  Preliminary  results 
suggest  that  the evidence  for beneficial  effects of slow labor  force growth  is much  weaker 
for the 1870-1960  period  than  for the post-1960  period.  This may  be a consequence  of the 
simultaneity  caused  by much  larger  immigration  flows  in the early  period.  At this point,  it 
seems fair  to conclude  that  there  is no international  evidence  for  the dynamism  hypothesis 
that  more  rapid  population  growth  or a younger  population  raises  productivity,  and  some 
evidence  for the contrary  labor  scarcity  hypothesis. D.  M. Cutler, J. M. Poterba,  L. M. Sheiner,  and L. H.  Summers  45 
Figure 16.  Consumption Response with Induced Productivity, United States,  1990-2065 
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Source:  Authors'  calculations.  For increasing  productivity,  it is assumed  that productivity  grows  0.5  percent for 
each  I percent decline  in annual labor force growth.  The consumption  measure  is needs-weighted  (CON2),  and the 
labor force  is  earnings-weighted  (LF2).  The  simulations  assume  unit elasticities  of  substitution  in production  and 
consumption. 
productivity  effects, following  a demographic  shock  like  those examined 
in the previous sections.48  The effect of increased  productivity  growth 
is to increase current consumption even more, by an additional  0.2 
percent.  Further,  because most of the productivity  benefits  occur in the 
next several  decades, when the labor  force grows slowly, consumption 
remains  above its initial  level throughout  the transition  path to the new 
steady state. 
Demographic  Change and Fiscal Policy 
The preceding section suggests that, other things being equal, the 
optimal response to recent and projected demographic  changes is a 
48. We  use the support  ratio  defined  with  the earnings-weighted  labor  force  and  needs- 
weighted consumption  measure. We also assume unit elasticities of substitution  in 
production  and  consumption. 46  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1.1990 
decline in the national saving rate. The implications  for fiscal policy 
depend upon how the private saving rate responds to demographic 
changes. Tax-smoothing  considerations  may also imply particular  pat- 
terns of optimal  fiscal  policy. This section examines  these issues. 
The effect of the population's  aging on private saving has been the 
subject  of a number  of analyses, but  no firm  conclusion  has yet emerged. 
From the standpoint  of the life-cycle hypothesis, slowing population 
growth  and an aging  society should  be associated with reductions  in the 
private saving rate. As the aged share of the population  increases, the 
ratio of dissavers to savers rises and so the private saving rate falls. 
David Weil has recently pointed out that this effect may be reinforced 
by an  increase  in  expected  bequests  per  member  of the adult  population.49 
On the other hand, many analysts  have argued  that the maturing  of the 
baby  boom generation  will raise  personal  saving  because people borrow 
when young  and  save as they approach  middle  age. Increases  in personal 
saving  may also result  from  people having  fewer children. 
Summers  and Carroll  explore the impact  of demographic  changes on 
saving  behavior  by assuming  constant  age-specific  saving  rates.50  Figure 
17  uses the age-specific  saving  rates  from  their  analysis,  as well as Social 
Security  Administration  population  forecasts, to project  personal  saving 
rates over the next 30 years. The results suggest  that  the maturing  of the 
population  will be associated  with a small  increase  in saving  rates  during 
the next three decades. Calculations  by Alan Auerbach  and Laurence 
Kotlikoff  reach similar  conclusions.51 
A near-term  increase  in private  saving  provides  a further  reason  why 
an economy with an initially optimal saving rate should loosen fiscal 
policy in response to changing  demographic  conditions. 
There is,  however, a different argument  for a tight fiscal policy. 
Projected  demographic  changes  imply  significant  fluctuations  in the level 
of government spending  over the next century, since transfers  to the 
49. Weil  (1989). 
50. Summers  and  Carroll  (1987). 
51. Auerbach  and Kotlikoff  (1989).  Both sets of calculations  are flawed  in ignoring 
pension saving, which may change  as the age structure  of the population  changes.  They 
also take no account of changes in the number  of children  or in the number  of people 
supporting  aged  parents,  although  these  factors  may  affect  age-specific  saving  rates.  David 
Weil (1990)  uses aggregate  data on OECD countries  to study saving, recognizing  these 
effects. His results  suggest  that  private  saving  in the United  States  may  rise  about  1  percent 
in the next decade  as a result  of demographic  factors. D.  M.  Cutler, J. M. Poterba,  L. M.  Sheiner,  and L. H.  Summers  47 
Figure 17.  Projected Private Saving Rate, United States,  1990-2065a 
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Source:  Summers  and Carroll (1987); Board  of  Trustees  of  the  Federal  Old-Age  and  Survivors  Insurance  and 
Disability Insurance Trust Funds (1988). 
a.  The calculations  assume  that the saving rate is held constant  by age. 
elderly are much larger than those to  any other group. Efficiency 
considerations  argue for higher current taxes to fund foreseeable in- 
creases  in government  outlays. Because the deadweight  loss of taxation 
increases  with the square  of the tax rate, financing  the anticipated  rise 
in government  outlays on a pay-as-you-go  basis, with lower tax rates 
during  the next few decades and higher  ones in the middle  of the next 
century, entails a larger deadweight  burden than a constant tax rate 
policy.52 This argument  parallels the traditional  justification  for using 
debt  to finance  wars  and  other  transitory  shocks  to government  spending. 
To evaluate the empirical  significance  of tax-smoothing  considera- 
tions, we begin by describing  the age-specific pattern of government 
outlays.  We  then  present  a simple  framework  for  evaluating  the  efficiency 
52. Barro  (1979)  describes  the "tax-smoothing"  view of optimal  government  financial 
policy. 48  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1990 
Table 8.  Per Capita Government Spending, by Age, United States,  1989 
1989  dollars 
Social 
security 
and  Health 
Age group  disability  care  Education  Total 
0-4  132  872  674  1,678 
5-14  132  690  3,353  4,175 
15-19  132  298  2,930  3,360 
20-24  16  298  1,112  1,426 
25-44  83  298  233  614 
45-64  811  218  84  1,113 
65 and over  6,138  3,526  84  9,748 
Total  925  824  873  2,622 
Sources:  Social  Security  Administration  (1987);  Waldo  and  others  (1989);  Board  of  Trustees  of  the  Federal 
Supplementary  Medical  Insurance  Trust Fund (1988).  For  details  regarding construction  of  the  data,  see  notes  to 
table 9. 
gains from tax smoothing and report suggestive calculations. These 
findings  imply relatively small efficiency improvements-on  the order 
of 1 percent of one year's GNP-from  stabilizing  tax rates throughout 
the next half-century. 
Age-Specific  Patterns  of Government Spending 
Governments spend different amounts on individuals of different 
ages. Outlays on education, for example, benefit primarily  children, 
while the elderly are the principal  beneficiaries of most government 
spending  on health care and social security. Even without changes in 
the structure  of government  programs,  demographic  shifts  can therefore 
affect the level of government  spending. 
Table 8 presents age-specific government  expenditure  patterns for 
the United States, focusing on the three largest social expenditures: 
social security, health care, and education. The first column shows 
spending  on Old-Age  and Survivors  and Disability  Insurance.  Virtually 
all such expenditures  are directed  to individuals  aged 65 or over, with 
average  outlays in 1986  of $6,138  per  person. The second column shows 
analogous  age-specific  spending  patterns  for health care, with average 
expenditures  per person  aged 65 and  over ($3,526)  more  than  four times 
larger  than outlays for any other age group. The third  column reports D.  M.  Cutler, J. M. Poterba,  L. M. Sheiner,  and L. H.  Summers  49 
Table 9.  Projected Government Expenditures, United States,  1990-2060 
Percent of GNP 
Social 
security 
and  Health 
Year  disability  care  Education  Other  Total 
1990  4.7  4.1  4.7  18.0  31.8 
2000  4.5  5.3  4.9  18.0  32.9 
2010  4.6  5.9  4.9  18.0  33.4 
2020  5.6  6.5  4.8  18.0  35.0 
2030  6.5  7.4  4.9  18.0  36.7 
2040  6.5  7.8  4.9  18.0  37.1 
2050  6.5  7.8  4.9  18.0  37.1 
2060  6.5  7.8  4.9  18.0  37.0 
Sources:  Social  security  and disability  spending  are predicted  from projected  population  growth  rates.  For  the 
1989 distribution of  spending,  we  projected  the year-end  1986 distribution from the Social  Security  Administration 
(1987) to  1989, using  the GNP  deflator.  Spending  at below  retirement ages  is the  sum of  OASDI  payments  to the 
disabled,  payments to early retirees,  and payments to surviving children and spouses.  Spending on all persons below 
20 years of age was treated as applying uniformly to the members of this group. 
For  health  care  spending,  we  combined  four types  of  spending.  We  obtained  1987 estimates  of  Medicare  and 
Medicaid  per capita  spending on  the elderly  for hospital  care,  physicians'  services,  nursing home  care,  and other 
personal health care from Waldo and others (1989). For the nonelderly population, we calculated government spending 
on each  of these  categories  as the difference  between  the Division  of  National  Cost  Estimates,  Office of Actuary, 
Health Care Financing Administration (1987) estimate  of  1987 total government  spending for that category  and the 
implied spending on the elderly.  This estimate  includes  both Medicaid spending for the nonelderly  and medical care 
spending  for government  employees.  We  distributed  this  spending  by  age  on  the  basis  of  Medicaid  spending,  as 
presented in Public Health Service  (1989). All of the estimates  were converted  to  1989 dollars using category-specific 
projections of  1987-1990 inflation in Division  of National  Cost Estimates,  Office of Actuary,  Health Care Financing 
Administration (1987). 
We forecast  spending using estimates  of inflation rates for the four categories  of spending  and projections  of the 
age distribution of the population. Hospital care estimates are from the Board of Trustees of the Federal Supplementary 
Medical Insurance Trust Fund (1988). They  imply a steady-state  inflation rate above  general inflation but below  the 
growth  rate of  output.  Inflation rates  for the  other  three  categories  were  projected  to  2000 using  the  Division  of 
National  Cost  Estimates,  Office  of  Actuary,  Health  Care  Financing  Administration  (1987)  estimates,  and  were 
assumed  to grow at the rate of hospital price inflation after that. 
Finally,  for age-specific  spending on education,  we  obtained  1986 age-specific  enrollment  rates in school  as well 
as  the  aggregate amounts  spent  on  primary and secondary  education,  and higher education.  We  assumed  that all 
persons  under 17 who were enrolled  in school  were  in primary and secondary  schools,  and all persons  18 and over 
who were enrolled were in higher education.  Spending per person  was then the weighted  average of the population 
in each  age  group  and the  share  of  each  age  group  in the  two  types  of  education.  Our projections  assume  that 
education spending would grow at the rate of GNP growth, so that changes in the share of GNP devoted  to education 
change only with changing numbers of young people. 
the age  profile  of education  spending.  Per  capita  expenditures  on schools 
for the younger cohorts are substantial, reaching $3,353 a year for 
children  between  the ages of 5 and 14. For  the three  programs  combined, 
spending  on the elderly  is more  than  double  that  of any other  group. 
Demographic  shifts can significantly  alter  government  outlays. Table 
9 reports projections  of total government  outlays as a share of GNP 
under  the assumption  that age-specific  expenditure  patterns  remain  at 
1989 levels for the next 60 years. Primary  government spending is 
assumed to equal a constant fraction of GNP. In these projections, 50  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1990 
government  spending  rises from 31.8 percent of GNP in 1990 to 37.0 
percent of GNP in 2060, with nearly all the increase due to changes in 
medical expenditures and transfer  programs  to the elderly. Our tax- 
smoothing  calculation  assesses the efficiency  gains from smoothing  the 
time  path  of revenues  needed  to collect this variable  expenditure  stream. 
The Efficiency  Gains from  Tax Smoothing 
We evaluate  the efficiency  gain  from  tax smoothing  by assuming  that 
the deadweight  burden  of raising  T  percent  of national  output  in taxes is 
given by 
(19)  DWL, =  ET2Yt/2. 
The parameter  E depends on the elasticities of aggregate supply and 
demand  and Y,  is national  income.53  The marginal  deadweight  loss per 
dollar of revenue raised is ET  We calibrate  E by setting the marginal 
deadweight  loss from raising  one dollar equal to 30 cents, the upper- 
bound estimate in Charles  Ballard,  John Shoven, and John Whalley's 
general  equilibrium  analysis of the U.S. tax system.54  Their  calculation 
employs 1973  data, when federal  and state-local  taxation  in the United 
States was 31 percent  of GNP, and  therefore  implies  E  -  1.0. 
We assume that  a government  planner  seeks to minimize  the present 
discounted  value of the deadweight  losses from  taxation  over a T  period 
horizon: 
T  [t 
(20)  V  f7 (1 + r)-  ET2  Y,/2, 
t=l  il 
where ri denotes the one-period  nominal  interest rate in period i. This 
minimization  is subject to an intertemporal  budget constraint  linking 
taxes and spending as a share of GNP (T, and ht, respectively) with 
government  debt as a share  of GNP (di). For each period,  this constraint 
is: 
(21)  dt =  dt 1 [(1 +  r1)I(1  +  yt)] +  ht -  Tt, 
53. If governments  set taxes to minimize  deadweight  loss, the marginal  deadweight 
burden  per revenue  dollar  should  be equal  across tax instruments.  The aggregate  tax-to- 
GNP ratio  is then  a simple  proxy  for the level of tax burdens.  This  convenient  assumption 
neglects the voluminous  public finance  literature  suggesting  that marginal  deadweight 
losses vary  across  tax instruments. 
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where r, is the interest rate and y, is the rate of output growth. 
Summing  this forward  yields a budget  constraint  of the form: 
T  T 
(22)  E Ttt  =  ht8t +  do -  d7ZT, 
t=l  t=1 
where  8t =  H=1 (1  +  ys)/(l  +  rs).  Minimizing equation  20 subject  to 
equation  22 yields first-order  conditions  of the form 
(23)  ETt=  A, 
so the optimal  policy calls for equal  tax rates in each period. 
In the case where r, =  -yt,  the benefits of tax smoothing take a 
particularly  simple  form. The budget  constraint  is 
T  T 
(24)  >LTt=  lht+do-dT- 
t=l  t=1 
If, further,  dT =  do, then with a pay-as-you-go  policy, taxes just cover 
government spending: T, =  h.  Under the constant period-by-period 
debt-to-GNP  policy, the deadweight  loss is 
(25)  DWL1 =  (Y0 e/2)  >ht2. 
The constant  tax rate satisfying  the government  budget  constraint  is just 
the average  value of government  spending,  so that 
(26)  DWL2 =  Yo  E/2  *  T  (>ht/T)2. 
Thus,  the  relative  deadweight  loss from  the optimal  tax-smoothing  policy 
is: 
(27)  DWL2/DWLI =  (Eht1J)21(Eht211). 
For the expenditure  path in table 9, the deadweight  loss reduction  in 
equation  27 is 0.3 percent. 
The  incremental  deadweight  loss from  time-varying  tax rates  depends 
on the precise time path of taxes, hence on the government's  choice of 
debt  policy. We consider  two such policies. The first  assumes  a constant 
debt-to-GNP  ratio in every year, and the second assumes a constant 
primary  surplus  (equal  to its value  in 1989  of 0.5 percent  of GNP) in each 
year. 
Table 10 presents our estimates of the efficiency gains from tax 
smoothing.  The upper  panel presents  results assuming  a constant debt- 52  Brookings  Papers  oni Economic  Activity,  1 :1990 




loss  as 
Year  petcent  of 
avetrage 
Tax rate  1990  2010  2030  2050  GNP 
Constant  debt-GNP  ratiob 
Variable rate  32.6  33.5  36.8  37.1  6.23 
Constant rate  35.3  35.3  35.3  35.3  6.22 
Constant pritnaty slurplusc 
Variable rate  32.3  33.9  37.2  37.6  6.52 
Constant rate  35.7  35.7  35.7  35.7  6.51 
Source:  Authors'  calculations  based on sources  described  in table 9. 
a.  For each  spending category,  total government  expenditures  are projected  to 2060, as described  in table 9. The 
two cases  are described  in more detail in the text. 
b.  Constant debt-GNP  ratio is fixed at 1989 level  of 50.2 percent. 
c.  Constant primary surplus assumes  that a federal and state-local  surplus equals its 1989 share of GNP throughout 
1990-2000. 
to-GNP ratio,  fixed  at its 1989  level of 50.2 percent. In this case the pay- 
as-you-go  tax rate  rises from  32.6 percent  of GNP in 1990  to 37.1 percent 
by 2050.  The average  deadweight  loss from  this policy, shown  in the last 
column, is 6.23 percent of the average  value of GNP. The constant tax 
rate that achieves the same debt-to-GNP  ratio  of 50.2 percent  in 2050  is 
35.3 percent. Under this plan, taxes would rise by 3 percent  of GNP- 
roughly $150 billion-in  1990. Despite this large change in the debt 
trajectory,  however, the change  in excess burden  is small. The average 
value of deadweight  loss is 6.22 percent  of average  GNP when tax rates 
are smoothed. The improvement  in deadweight loss averages 0.017 
percent of GNP annually,  or less than $1 billion a year in 1990  dollars. 
The change  in the  present value of deadweight  losses between 1990  and 
2060  equals 1.1 percent  of 1990  GNP, or approximately  $55 billion. 
The lower panel in table 10 shows parallel  calculations  assuming  the 
combined  federal and state-local  primary  surplus  equals its 1989 share 
of GNP value throughout  the 1990  to 2050 period. The results indicate 
that  the average  excess-burden-to-GNP  ratio  under  this scenario  is 6.52 
percent, compared  with 6.51 percent if the tax rate is smoothed. The 
difference between these two efficiency costs is similar  to that in our 
first  case, 0.017  percent  of GNP. Plausible  variations  in our  assumptions D.  M.  Cutler, J. M. Poterba,  L. M. Sheiner,  and L. H.  Summers  53 
about  the debt-to-GNP  trajectory  therefore  do not appear  to have large 
effects on the efficiency  gains from  tax smoothing.  The general  conclu- 
sion of these calculations  is that  there  is only a weak tax-efficiency  case 
for prepaying  the costs of the future  dependency  burden. 
Conclusions 
Demographic  changes currently  in progress do not appear  likely to 
worsen economic performance  in the United States, at least during  the 
next several decades. While increased dependency will reduce living 
standards  by 5-10 percent  in the long run, demographic  changes  will be 
beneficial  over the next 20 years. In the short  run, demographic  change 
will have two important  effects. First, slowing population  growth will 
permit  a smaller  share  of national  output  to be devoted to investment  in 
plant,  equipment,  and  housing. Second, the share  of the population  that 
is working  will rise, largely  as a result of the falling  relative population 
of children. These positive effects of demographic  change may be 
reinforced  by increased  foreign  capital  inflows  and  accelerating  technical 
change  as firms  respond  to an increasing  scarcity  of labor. 
Recent and prospective demographic changes do not appear to 
warrant  increasing the national saving rate. These changes increase 
wealth in the short run, reduce the rate of return  to saving, and attract 
foreign capital. Holding all else  equal, their net effect would be a 
reduction  in the optimal national saving rate. Nor do tax-smoothing 
factors  represent  an  important  argument  for trying  to prepay  the govern- 
ment's  prospective  liability  to support  a dependent  population.  There  is 
little  efficiency  loss in following  a pay-as-you-go  policy with variable  tax 
rates. 
Our  conclusion  departs  from analyses, such as that of Henry Aaron, 
Barry  Bosworth,  and  Gary  Burtless,  that  recommend  accumulation  of a 
large  social security  trust  fund to bolster U.S. national  saving.55  These 
positions are not necessarily inconsistent, however. A first line of 
reconciliation  would hold that apart  from demographic  considerations, 
American  national  saving  is much  too low right  now and that the social 
security  trust  fund  provides  a politically  convenient  way of reducing  the 
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federal  government's  absorption  of private saving.56  The decline in the 
private saving rate from an average of 7.1 percent during  the 1970s  to 
about  3 percent  during  1986-89  is greater  than  what  our  analysis  suggests 
can be justified by demographic  factors. There are even some reasons 
for advocating an increase in the U.S.  national saving rate to levels 
above those observed historically,  particularly  in light of the emerging 
need for capital  in Eastern  Europe  and  the signs that saving  is declining 
outside of the United States. 
A second potential  reconciliation  of these views involves questions 
of optimal intergenerational  redistribution.  Some argue for using the 
social security trust fund to raise the national saving rate in order to 
avoid unfairly  burdening  our children.  The primary  thrust  of this argu- 
ment-that  we need to prepare  for the anticipated  burden  of increased 
dependency-is  exactly what  our support  ratio  calculations  reject. This 
is because the dependency  burden  is remote, and because slower labor 
force growth means more rapidly diminishing  returns to additional 
saving. Admittedly, our approach  focuses on the economy's year-by- 
year consumption  level, rather  than  the welfare  of individual  cohorts. It 
is therefore  poorly suited to addressing  arguments  that certain  cohorts 
will be greatly disadvantaged  without additional  capital accumulation. 
However, we do not find  compelling  the claim that our children  will be 
unfairly  burdened  unless we increase  capital  accumulation  today. 
Two arguments  militate  against  the intergenerational  equity case for 
trust fund accumulation.  First, if the aforementioned  fears of inequity 
were correct, the appropriate  response should be an adjustment  in the 
level of prospective intergenerational  transfers,  not a change in capital 
accumulation  policy. Just as concerns about the income distribution  at 
a particular  time are better addressed through transfer policies than 
through  changes  in the mix of products  produced,  transfers  are the right 
way to respond  to concerns  about  intergenerational  equity.57 
Second, other considerations  operate  to make the baby boom gener- 
ation  less well off than  its successors. The baby  boomers  systematically 
lose because of their  large  cohort  size. During  their  working  years, wage 
growth  is slow  because  of low capital-labor  ratios.  During  their  retirement 
years, the number  of potential purchasers  of capital will fall, thereby 
56. See, for example,  Hatsopoulos,  Krugman,  and  Summers  (1988). 
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reducing  the rate of return  on saving.58  Moreover, given productivity 
growth,  the next generation  will be considerably  more affluent  than the 
current one. If slower population growth or foreign capital inflows 
accelerate  this tendency, the case for intergenerational  redistribution  is 
reduced. Even with our estimates of the path of optimal  consumption, 
along  which a declining  support  ratio  reduces consumption,  the lifetime 
utility of a person who lives for eighty years rises  for those born from 
1990  until  2020. Only after 2020 does the lifetime  utility of new cohorts 
fall below that  of those who lived before the demographic  change. 
Our aggregate  analysis cannot resolve policy debates about raising 
the birth  rate  or increasing  immigration,  since these debates often focus 
on microeconomic  effects and distributional  consequences. Moreover, 
there  is a fundamental  political  difficulty  of deciding "who is us." How 
should  the welfare of immigrants  be treated  in deciding  whether  or not 
to accept more of them?  How should  the utility  of an otherwise  unborn 
child  be treated?  Policy recommendations  are  impossible  without  a clear 
philosophical  resolution  of these questions. 
Our analysis does, however, cast some doubt on the view that in 
narrow  economic  terms, higher  fertility  is helpful  in reducing  the burden 
of dependency  in old age. Dependency  at the beginning  of the life cycle 
is between 50 percent and 100 percent as costly as dependency at the 
end of the life cycle. It also comes 60 years earlier. Furthermore,  the 
weak available  evidence suggests  that slower  population  growth  is more 
likely to raise than  to reduce  productivity  growth. 
For the set of issues captured  by our analysis, there  is a stronger  case 
for increased immigration  as a way of reducing dependency. Most 
immigrants  arrive  as young adults and so begin working  without being 
dependents  first.  To the extent that they immediately  start  paying  taxes 
for the support  of the elderly, they may increase economic welfare of 
the  preexisting  population,  even if they are  ultimately  eligible  for  transfer 
payments  in old age. 
We have only scratched  the surface  in assessing the macroeconomic 
implications  of demographic  change. Among the main priorities for 
future  research, we would include the following. First, any effects of 
58. Mankiw  and  Weil  (1989)  predict  that  real  house  prices  will  fall  by almost  50  percent 
over  the next  20 years  because  of demographic  changes.  While  their  results  may  overstate 
the coming  decline,  even small  reductions  in house  prices  would  transfer  large  amounts  of 
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demography  on the rate of technical  change  are likely to dwarf  its other 
consequences.  It  would  be valuable  to refine  our  estimates  by considering 
data spanning  longer periods and by experimenting  with alternative 
control variables. Second, how demographic  changes affect private 
saving  remains  uncertain.  Investigating  the international  experience  on 
this question seems worthwhile, particularly  if long-term  data can be 
located. Third,  our calculations  have assumed  that  the nonmedical  care 
needs of the elderly are equal to those for the nonelderly.  Whether  this 
assumption  is correct, and whether it will remain  correct as the aged 
population  ages, needs to be investigated.  Fourth,  it would be useful to 
analyze more systematically  the impact  of demographic  changes  on the 
welfare of different  cohorts. This would require  a life-cycle analysis of 
the questions  we address  with an infinite  horizon  setting.59 
It would also be useful to explore  the microeconomic  implications  of 
changing  demography.  For example,  our  aggregation  of capital  may  well 
be inappropriate  if demographic  change alters the relative  demands  for 
housing and nonhousing  capital. Similarly,  demographic  changes may 
have  important  implications  for  the  labor  market  position  of aged  workers 
and  for the relative  demands  for workers  in different  occupations. 
Further  research  on these and other related  topics is likely to refine 
the conclusions  about  demographic  change  reached  here. We doubt  that 
it will alter our primary  conclusion that demographic  change provides 
opportunities  as well as challenges. 
59. Auerbach  and Kotlikoff  (1987)  and Auerbach  and others (1989)  use a life-cycle 
model  to consider  demographic  issues, but they assume  counterfactually  that  consumers 
actually  vary their  saving  rates as the model would  predict  and do not use the model  for 
normative  analysis. Comments 
and Discussion 
George A. Akerlof: The authors  document  the dramatic  demographic 
changes  that  have been taking  place in the United States since 1940:  the 
steep increase in fertility  in the 1940s  and 1950s  followed by the sharp 
decline in fertility in the 1960s.1  Although the ratio of elderly to the 
working  population  is projected  to decline over the next two decades 
while  the baby  boomers  remain  active in the work  force, large  increases 
in this ratio are projected after 2010 when the baby boomers become 
retirees. The authors  explore whether these demographic  changes are 
cause for concern, focusing especially on the adjustments  that should 
occur in national  saving  rates. 
Their  paper  shows, convincingly  in  my  opinion,  that  decreased  fertility 
rates are not a reason for increased  national  saving even though  lower 
fertility  eventually causes an increase in the ratio of the retired  to the 
working  population.  In the simple  Solow model  of economic  growth,  the 
change in an economy's capital-labor  ratio at a point in time is the 
difference  between saving  per worker  and "capital-widening"  require- 
ments per worker;  the capital-widening  requirement  per worker  is the 
investment  per worker  needed to equip new entrants  to the work force 
with the same capital as existing workers. A decline in fertility, other 
things  equal, lowers the economy's capital-widening  requirements  and 
increases the growth rate of the capital-labor  ratio. Intuitively, the 
desirability  of adding  to society's stock of capital depends on the gap 
between the marginal  productivity  of capital and society's rate of time 
preference.  With the saving rate fixed, a decline in fertility promotes 
"capital  deepening"  (it raises the growth  rate of the capital-labor  ratio) 
that, in turn,  lowers the marginal  productivity  of capital  relative to the 
1. These  comments  were prepared  jointly  with  Janet  Yellen. 
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rate of time preference;  as a result, the optimal  saving rate is reduced. 
Optimal  saving  is lower because, with decreased  fertility  rates, there is 
less need for investment  to equip  a growing  work  force. 
This paper seems to fly in the face of conventional  wisdom, which 
argues that demographic  trends are one reason why U.S.  saving is 
inadequate.  According  to a common  argument,  the increases  in fertility 
during  the 1940s  and 1950s  necessitate an increase in saving to provide 
for the baby boomers' retirement.  In contrast, the authors  argue that 
current  demographic  trends  do not necessitate higher  saving. 
Appearances  to the contrary,  these two approaches  are not mutually 
inconsistent.  The  two points  of view are  analyzing  the same  phenomenon 
from different time perspectives. The baby boom-baby bust demo- 
graphic  cycle, which  the United States has experienced,  consisted of an 
increase  in fertility  starting  in the 1940s,  followed by a decline  in fertility 
beginning  in 1960.  The  demographic  changes  that  began  in 1940  optimally 
called  for an increase  in the saving  rate (to appropriately  equip  the baby 
boomers  with  capital  during  their  working  years)  followed  by a decrease 
in the saving rate when the baby boom ended and declining fertility 
lowered capital-widening  requirements. 
According to the conventional view, saving did not increase as it 
should have when fertility increased, perhaps  because of institutional 
factors such as social security and retirement  plans whose benefits are 
directly  linked  to social security.  Because the saving  rate  apparently  did 
not rise in response to the fertility increase, it should rise now. In 
contrast, the authors, with a different starting  point, ask how saving 
should respond to recent and anticipated  demographic  changes. Their 
answer  is that, other  things  being  equal, saving  rates should  decline now 
because declining  fertility  ratesjustify  a decline  in savings.  If the insights 
of these two views were combined,  one might  conclude  that  if the saving 
rate  had  increased  in response  to the increase  in fertility  in the 1940s  and 
1950s as it should have, demographic  factors beginning  in 1960 and 
projected  into the next century  would  optimally  call  for declining  saving. 
But because the saving rate did not increase when it should have, in 
response  to earlier  demographic  trends,  it may  be unwise  to lower saving 
rates now in response to current  and projected  future  trends. Properly 
interpreted,  I therefore agree with the authors' assertion that "other 
things  being  equal,  the optimal  policy response  to recent  and  anticipated 
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increase  in the national  saving rate." But I also agree with the popular 
wisdom that the as yet inadequate  response to the baby boom, which 
began in the 1940s, partly accounts for the inadequacy  of the current 
capital  stock. 
The authors  tell us: do not worry  about  the future  dependency  of the 
baby boomers. If you had saved a great deal in response to the baby 
boomers  (as the planner  would have in their  model), now is the time for 
an increase in consumption. However, most peoples' worry is the 
opposite: they worry that we have not saved in response to the baby 
boom and, therefore,  that saving should  increase now while some time 
remains  to prepare  for the dependency  bulge. 
An analogy  is apt. A traveler  leaves Chicago  bound  for Cedar  Rapids. 
He notes that his plane is traveling  east. He tells the stewardess about 
his anxiety, saying  that  Cedar  Rapids  is west of Chicago  and  the plane  is 
heading  in the wrong  direction.  The stewardess is reassuring.  She tells 
him that if he had begun his trip in Salt Lake City, where, on her 
assumptions,  he should have started  it, then he should be headed east, 
as the plane  is currently  going. 
The correct moral to draw from the authors' paper is subtle. They 
have  rightly  reassured  us that  the consequences  of our  profligacy  are  not 
as dire as imagined,  since the baby busters will require  relatively little 
investment  to satisfy capital-widening  requirements. 
The authors  also examine  the implications  of population  aging  in the 
context of an explicit open-economy model. As they show, the trade 
partners  of the United States will experience increases in dependency 
that are even more pronounced  than those in the United States. More- 
over, the near-term  decline in dependency projected for the United 
States  will not occur abroad.  According  to a naive view, these develop- 
ments abroad  are cause for concern. The United States is now highly 
dependent  on foreign saving to finance its current  spending. If saving 
abroad  falls as dependency  there  increases, foreign  lending  may dry  up, 
resulting  in rising  interest  rates  and  a declining  dollar.  The authors  point 
out the flaw in this naive scenario. The demographic  changes that are 
occurring  alter not only optimal  consumption  but also optimal  invest- 
ment.  Over  the next several  decades, investment  needs will  decline  more 
quickly  in other countries  than in the United States. In the absence of 
international  capital  flows, the return  to investment should  fall abroad 
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capital  flows  into  the United  States  should  increase,  not  decrease.  Taking 
into account  the possibility  of international  borrowing  and  the likelihood 
that  other  countries  will  wish  to export  more,  not  less, capital  strengthens 
the authors'  conclusion  that, other things  being equal, saving need not 
rise now. 
The  authors  advance  two reasons  for  their  view of the  relation  between 
the growth and age of the labor force and productivity  growth. First, 
workers  of different  ages may contribute  differentially  to technological 
innovation. This is an age-embodied  model of technological change. 
Second, diminished  labor  force growth  may  result  in labor  force scarcity 
that  raises  wages and  results  in labor-saving  technological  progress.  The 
authors produce evidence that rapid labor force growth is negatively 
associated with rapid productivity  increase and positively associated 
with  the average  age of the labor  force in cross-section  regressions.  How 
much support  this gives to their  model of technological  progress  is hard 
to say. The authors' regressions omit wages. Furthermore,  a cause 
common  to both may yield a relation  between productivity  growth  and 
labor force growth and population  age but in no way imply a causal 
relation between the demographic  factors and technological change. 
Following  Max  Weber,  to give one example,  Protestantism  is responsible 
not only for the capitalist  ethic and rapid innovation  but also for low 
fertility. Thus productivity  change and demographic  change may have 
the same root cause without  any implication  that one causes the other. 
The authors'  fixed-effects  regression  controls for intercountry  cultural 
differences  and  potentially  answers  the objection  that  persistent  cultural 
differences  across  countries  account  for the relation  between productiv- 
ity growth  and  fertility.  The slope of this regression  shows that  as OECD 
countries (not including  the United States) switched from high to low 
fertility,  the  rate  of productivity  growth  rose. But  it is not  fully  convincing 
that  the relationship  is causal  rather  than  coincidental.  Third,  in a cleaner 
test, output  per unit input, the Solow residual,  would be chosen rather 
than  productivity  as the dependent  variable. 
In the final section of the paper the authors address whether taxes 
should be raised now in anticipation  of higher  burdens  of government 
expenditure  as the population  ages. The paper compares the relative 
merits of a tax-smoothing  strategy, in which taxes would be increased 
now, before dependency  ratios increase, and of a pay-as-you-go  policy 
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under  a pay-as-you-go  policy will be substantial-amounting  to approx- 
imately 4.5 percent of GNP. Thus, in the absence of tax smoothing, 
future  generations  will have to pay a significantly  higher  portion  of their 
income for social security and medicare  benefits. An advantage  of tax 
smoothing  over pay-as-you-go  is the lower deadweight  burdens from 
taxation.  According  to Barro,  an optimal  tax policy would smooth  taxes 
to  minimize deadweight loss.  Although the authors agree that tax 
smoothing  is more efficient  than a pay-as-you-go  policy, they reassure 
us that little will be lost if the government  waits to raise taxes until the 
dependency ratio actually increases. Their calculations show that the 
efficiency loss from pay-as-you-go is  small even with a 30 percent 
deadweight  loss associated with the marginal  dollar  of revenue. 
Although  I agree with the analysis, as far as it goes, I find the tax- 
smoothing  issue one of misplaced  emphasis.  There  is more  at stake than 
aggregate  efficiency  considerations  in the tax now-tax later  debate. Tax 
policy matters  both to income  distribution  between generations  and  also 
to aggregate  capital  accumulation.  In their  simulations,  with  tax smooth- 
ing, early generations  would be roughly 2?/2  percent poorer and later 
generations  would  be 21/2  percent  richer.  A pay-as-you-go  policy benefits 
the current  generation,  but inflicts  significant,  avoidable  burdens  on our 
children.  This assumes, of course, that Ricardian  equivalence  does not 
hold, for under Ricardian  equivalence, the timing of tax collections is 
irrelevant  to intergenerational  income distribution,  and thus efficiency 
is the sole appropriate  concern of policy. In a Ricardian  world, if taxes 
are imposed later rather than sooner, we will simply bequeath our 
children  correspondingly  additional  wealth. 
As the authors implicitly recognize, in the absence of Ricardian 
equivalence,  the tax policy that  is selected to finance  a given program  of 
government expenditures to the aged affects the pattern of capital 
accumulation.  A tax-smoothing  policy would lower consumption  and 
promote  greater  capital  accumulation  now in advance  of the increase  in 
the dependency  ratio;  in contrast, a pay-as-you-go  policy would result 
in lower capital  formation  now and later.The  authors  deal with capital 
accumulation  and taxes separately, whereas, in fact, these two issues 
are not separable. 
The authors  also argue  that  optimal  capital  accumulation  and income 
distribution  among individuals  living at the same time are separable 
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concerning  capital  accumulation,  is primarily  concerned  with  the  optimal 
intertemporal  distribution  of consumption  among individuals  alive at 
different times. The solution depends on the chosen social rate of 
discount, p, reflecting  concern  for those alive now relative  to those who 
will be alive later. When  considering  tax and savings  policy, the authors 
disregard  the distribution  of consumption  among members  of different 
generations  alive at a given date, because they argue  that these issues 
are separable. According to the authors, an optimal distribution  of 
consumption  between members  of different  generations  who are alive 
at a given moment  should  be handled  by age-specific  transfer  programs. 
However, practically,  this entails  either  explicit or implicit  adjustments 
to social security  benefits. It is an odd exercise to project  current  levels 
of social security and other age-specific  government  expenditures  and 
to advocate a pay-as-you-go  system of taxation to fund these benefits 
while, at the same time, suggesting that if the income distributional 
consequences  of these taxes are  considered  undesirable  "the  appropriate 
response should  be an adjustment  in the level of prospective  intergener- 
ational transfers.  .  .  ."  Such an adjustment, in effect,  would amount to 
offering  retirees  lower social security  payments  to avoid  the higher  taxes 
on workers  that  would  be levied under  the pay-as-you-go  policy. 
I would agree with James Tobin that "the overriding  long-run  issue 
about OASI is the balance between the tax contributions  of the young 
and the benefits of the old."2 The concern here lies not just with 
intergenerational  income distribution,  but also with the perceived fair- 
ness of the social security  system. If the system is seen as unfair,  younger 
generations may renege on the promises implicitly made to the older 
generations. And, perhaps more important,  government will lose its 
moral  authority  to redistribute  national  income. 
In conclusion, let me say that this is a very interesting  paper. In 
particular,  it reinforces the wisdom of development economists and 
family planners  that fertility declines are almost always economically 
beneficial.  In the case of the United States, although  the fertility  decline 
has posed unexpected problems  for our pay-as-you-go  social security 
system, still, it has  resulted  in  less, rather  than  a greater,  need  for  national 
saving. 
2. Tobin  (1988,  p. 42). D.  M.  Cutler, J. M. Poterba,  L. M. Sheiner,  and L. H.  Summers  63 
Martin Neil Baily:  As I was reading  this paper I was reminded  of a 
phone call I received a few years ago from someone at the Readers' 
Digest. She was a fact checker and she was working  on an article  by a 
futurologist.  He had claimed  that  GNP would  be twice as large  30 years 
from  now as it is today. Would  I please say if this was correct. I took out 
my calculator  and figured  out that this represented  a 2.5 percent a year 
growth  rate, so I said it seemed fine to me. When  I got off the phone, I 
reflected  that forecasting  long-term  growth rates was a risky, perhaps 
even a foolish, business. The whole idea of fact-checking  predictions 
seemed  a little  wacky. But as this  paper  makes  clear,  long-term  forecasts 
are  directly  relevant  to personal  and  policy decisions today. The optimal 
saving  rate  depends  heavily on the expected rate  of productivity  growth 
over the long term. Such forecasting  is necessary. 
This paper  is a tour de force in many  ways. It provides  a systematic 
attempt  to apply  the  principles  of optimal  growth  to a  problem  of empirical 
importance.  It is comprehensive  in taking  into account  not only changes 
in the work force but also the relation  between the work force and the 
population,  the different  social demands  of the young and the old, and 
the consequences  of international  capital  flows. My comments  will cover 
some points of detail  and  then look at a more  basic concern. 
First, in assessing the dependency ratio, the authors  point out cor- 
rectly that the rise in the number  of old people will be offset by the 
decline in the number  of young people. They take some account of the 
fact that old people use more resources than young, but perhaps not 
enough. The effect of many of the advances in medicine has been to 
allow old people to live longer. As Summers  and Poterba know from 
their  prior  work, the biggest  gains  in reductions  of death'rates  have been 
for those over 80. If these trends in medical advance and longevity 
continue, they will have an impact on the effective dependency ratio. 
The study of long-term  care by Alice Rivlin and Joshua Wiener has 
indicated  that a tremendous  increase in medical  and nursing  home care 
will probably  be needed.  I 
The authors  also take account of the increase in the time people are 
spending  in retirement,  but there too I wonder if the effect could have 
been understated.  The resource cost of the growing  cohort of elderly is 
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likely to become very large  indeed  in the next century.  My intuition  says 
that  we should  prepare  now for the social problems  that  this will create, 
and  the authors'  paper  has not overcome this intuition. 
Second, the argument  is made  that the gains from tax smoothing  are 
not very great.  This  does not seem to fit  with  observed  political  behavior. 
Substantial  political battles have been waged over tax rate changes 
roughly  the same as the changes  given here. The political  consequences 
of a shift  from  taxes being 32 percent  of income to 37 percent  of income 
are likely to be substantial, particularly  if the increase translates in 
practice  into a 10  percentage  point increase  in the payroll  tax. If overall 
deadweight  loss were the only criterion  by which to judge tax changes, 
then presumably  we should  consider  the poll tax an exemplary  tax. The 
marchers  in Trafalgar  Square  who were throwing  chairs, however, did 
not seem overly impressed  by the small deadweight  losses implied  by 
Margaret  Thatcher'  s poll tax. 
Of course, much of the political  debate over taxes turns  on distribu- 
tional  issues, but supporting  the elderly  will  be a distributional  issue too, 
with the burden  falling  on workers  and  the benefits  falling  on retirees. If 
the Moynihan  view that there is no need to accumulate  a surplus  in the 
social security  trust  fund  prevails, today's debate on that issue is likely 
to reverberate  in Congress  30 years from  now: "Why should  we impose 
these huge taxes on our workers today when the current  beneficiaries 
refused to pay their share when they were working?" Presumably, 
cutting  benefits  to the elderly  will be the other  alternative. 
Third,  the open-economy simulations  assume too much capital mo- 
bility. One can make  a pretty  good argument  that  there is perfect  capital 
mobility  for short-term  government  securities.  But there  certainly  is not 
perfect  mobility  for factories  or business capital  generally.  Flows of real 
capital, like real trade  flows, are very sticky. It is certainly  possible to 
finance  our budget  deficit with capital  inflows, as we have discovered. 
And those inflows may also inflate  property  markets  in Honolulu and 
Manhattan,  but they do not do much for business capital  formation  or 
productivity.  The portfolio  choice that  an economy makes  is affected  by 
the preferences  of the owners of the capital  and hence where the saving 
is coming from. 
Fourth, there are better ways of capturing  the impact of changing 
demographics  on productivity  than the regression  approach  used here. 
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Denison, and others in their accounting studies of past growth to 
construct  adjusted  labor  inputs  could be used to simulate  the effects on 
productivity  of the projected  demographic  changes.2  It would also be 
better to start with the standard  hypothesis that relative wages reflect 
relative  marginal  products  and that the projected  aging  will raise future 
productivity  as more  workers  move into their  high-productivity  years. 
The attempt  in the paper  to estimate that demographic  changes will 
have a big bang for the buck is not convincing. The hypothesis is not 
tested by starting  with the standard  alternate  hypothesis, based on age- 
earnings profiles, and then seeing if the data suggest a significantly 
greater  impact. Anecdotal evidence abounds  that older workers find it 
harder  to adjust  to changes  in technology. 
Fifth, the authors  do not comment  on one demographic  offset to the 
projected  benefits  of aging.  John  Bishop  has investigated  the hypothesis 
that general intellectual  achievement is important  to productivity  and 
that boosting general  intellectual  achievement  is what schooling does, 
at least up to the end of high school.3  Various  measures  of that achieve- 
ment  have shown  declines  beginning  in  the late 1960s.  In  an  earlier  paper, 
I argued  that  this decline in test scores could not have had  a major  effect 
on productivity  in the 1970s  because of the small size of the cohort that 
had entered the labor force.4 Bishop suggests that the effects are 
becoming  larger  in the 1990s-the  low-score rabbit  is now moving into 
the middle  of the labor  force snake. 
I turn  now to the more  general  concern.  I find  it hard  to put  the paper's 
findings  in context. The authors are looking for the partial effect of 
demographic  changes on the optimal  saving rate. That is obviously an 
interesting  issue to look at, but it is hard to read the analysis without 
worrying  that  the U.S. economy is probably  a long way from  an optimal 
path of accumulation  for other reasons, notably  because of the growth 
slowdown,  government  dissaving,  and  life-cycle saving  requirements. 
My reading  of the optimal growth literature  of the 1960s is that it 
implied  that the U.S.  economy was saving too little. The optimality 
condition  is that  the rate of profit  should  equal  the rate of growth  plus a 
discount  factor. Plausible  rates of discount left the profit  rate too high 
and  hence the capital  intensity  of the economy too low. Taxes and  risks 
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are reasons why private decisions can lead to nonoptimal  social out- 
comes. 
These findings  from  the 1960s  were being  applied  to an economy with 
relatively  rapid  growth.  The productivity  growth  slowdown  should  have 
led to a substantial  increase in the optimal  level of saving, unless one 
believes that the slowdown is just temporary.  The living standards  of 
future  generations  are  going  to be much  lower than  we thought.  If saving 
was already too low and has subsequently  fallen sharply, and if the 
optimal  rate of saving has risen because of the productivity  slowdown, 
then we now have a huge gap between the actual  rate of saving  and the 
optimal rate. Even if the authors  are correct that the partial  effect of 
demographic  change is to lower the optimal  saving  rate, their  finding  is 
cold comfort. 
Turning  specifically  to the demographic  issue, I did not understand  a 
key element in the modeling.  Once we take into account the human  life 
cycle, the objective  function  of the optimal  growth  planner  changes.  The 
planner  should  not maximize  the integral  of discounted  per capita  utility 
times the number  of people. The integral  of the lifetime utility of each 
member  of the population  times the number  of people would  be a better 
concept. And  I think  that  affects  the conclusions. For example,  compare 
two  economies with different demographic compositions. The two 
economies might  have different  rates of growth  of output  and different 
intertemporal  consumption patterns, but the lifetime utility of any 
individual  could  be the same in the two economies. And presumably  the 
reverse situation  could hold, where the aggregates  look the same in two 
economies, but individuals  have rather  different  lifetime  utilities. 
This issue of lifetime utility affects the concluding section of the 
paper, where the authors  ask how their  findings  can be reconciled  with 
the idea that the social security trust  fund should build up a surplus  to 
pay for the retirement  of the baby boom generation.  The place to start 
when deciding whether social security decisions are correct is to ask 
what  rational  far-sighted  people  would  do if there  were no social security. 
The life-cycle model  says that  individuals  in their  high-income  years  will 
save for retirement. That will surely translate into higher aggregate 
saving in periods like the current one when a large fraction of the 
population  is in its high-income  years. 
The pure  retirement  element  of the social security system is presum- 
ably based on the assumption that many people either do not make 
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forces them to save for their retirement.  Then to mimic the rational 
private  decision, the trust  fund  should  now build  up a surplus.  Why  does 
this not show up in the authors'  results? 
Without  tinkering  at length  with the optimal  growth  conditions, I am 
not sure,  but  I think  it is related  to one of the things  that  Charles  Schultze 
and I pointed to in a recent paper.5  The steady-state  rate of growth of 
the U.S. economy has declined, and so the rate of profit  is declining. 
The projected  decline in the growth of the labor  force will drive down 
the rate of profit  further.  The decline in the warranted  rate of growth  is 
driving  the authors'  conclusion  that  the optimal  saving  rate  will decline. 
This result  is very much  a steady-state  conclusion, however, and there 
is no guarantee  that the same result should hold even over periods of 
several  decades. 
It is not clear from theory that a decline in the rate of profit  should 
reduce saving  by rational  individuals,  and it is not clear from empirical 
evidence that actual people do reduce saving when the rate of return 
declines. I would expect the life-cycle effect to dominate  over the rate 
of profit  effect so that  the aggregate  saving  rate of rational  savers would 
increase as the baby boomers hit their peak earnings  years. If so, the 
social security  trust  fund should  follow their  lead. 
Of course social security is not only a forced retirement  program;  it 
is also redistributive.  And there  the authors  have a good point. The baby 
boomers have had it tough competing  against their own large cohort. 
They  are entitled  to expect later  generations  to contribute  to the support 
of the low-income  elderly in the next century. The build-up  of the trust 
fund  should  not try to do it all. 
This is a provocative and important  paper that questions a conven- 
tional wisdom about the appropriate  way to respond to demographic 
changes.  The model has not settled some important  issues, but it is not 
wrong  either. It raises legitimate  questions  about the level of saving  we 
should  expect or seek. 
General Discussion 
The paper's implications  for national  saving policy sparked  a lively 
discussion. William  Nordhaus  praised  the paper  for raising  the quality 
of the analysis  about the effects of demographic  trends  on the national 
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saving rate. A number  of other panelists expressed concern that the 
paper  would  be misunderstood  and  misused  in the current  policy debate 
over national  saving. Gary  Burtless  emphasized  that  if the saving  rate is 
too low to begin with, slower labor force growth should not be an 
argument  for decreasing it further. Lawrence Summers  agreed that it 
would be desirable to raise the national saving rate for a variety of 
reasons, but said the point of the paper is that demographic  change is 
not one of them. Charles  Schultze suggested simulating  desired future 
saving using the assumption  that the initial stock of capital  is less than 
optimal.  Although  estimates  of the marginal  effects of population  might 
be quite similar  to those in the paper, such simulations  would avoid the 
impression that policy should aim to  reduce saving from current, 
suboptimal  levels. Robert  Gordon  dissented  from the widely held view 
that current national saving is too low.  He noted that net private 
investment  is close to the level necessary to maintain  the capital-output 
ratio. The projected  decline in the population  growth  rate and increase 
in private  saving  due to the change  in the age distribution  should  mitigate 
any concerns that investment is being financed by a current  account 
deficit.  He also pointed  out  that  the  changes  in  per  capita  income  resulting 
from different  capital-output  ratios are small compared  with the uncer- 
tainty about the future growth in productivity. The real problem for 
policy, he contended, is the lack of public investment  and the need to 
redistribute  the peace dividend  in that  direction. 
Various panelists questioned whether the results were robust with 
respect to certain  changes in assumptions.  While noting that the theo- 
retical  possibility  that declining  fertility  might  increase welfare  was not 
new, Henry Aaron wondered whether the proposition  would be valid 
for one country  in a world  economy. In particular,  he did not regard  the 
OECD as an adequate  representative  for the "rest of the world," and 
argued  that  the inclusion  of non-OECD  countries  might  well reverse the 
authors' presumption  that the net supply of savings from abroad will 
increase.  Albert  Wojnilower  agreed  that  non-OECD  countries  should  be 
considered.  Lawrence  Summers  noted  that  in light  of the low returns  on 
investment  in the southern  hemisphere,  both historical  and  anticipated, 
that  region  was unlikely  to be a user of saving. 
Burtless doubted that the social-welfare  function used in the paper 
captured  the unpleasant  trade-off  between the consumption  of different 
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enjoy real income twice as high as our own, it might be difficult to 
persuade  us to make an additional  consumption  sacrifice  today so that 
their  incomes  could  be 2.1 times  higher  than  our  own. On  the other  hand, 
if we thought  that  our  grandchildren  would  be barely  better  off-or  even 
worse off-than  we are, then many of us might be willing to make a 
sacrifice  of current  consumption  in order  to raise their  living standards. 
Burtless  suggested  that  a major  argument  for higher  saving  today is that 
we have become less optimistic about the income prospects of our 
grandchildren,  primarily  because of a sharp  drop  in productivity  growth. 
The demographic  shock of a higher  dependency  ratio, which is empha- 
sized in the paper, is not the main reason for pessimism about future 
living standards.  Hence, even if demographic  concerns by themselves 
do not push us to raise current  saving rates, other concerns push us in 
that  direction.  Edmund  Phelps  was curious  how the  optimal  consumption 
time path would vary if it was calculated with successively lower 
intertemporal  substitution  elasticities. He speculated  that, in the limit, 
current  consumption  might  go down, not up. Thomas  Juster  wondered 
how the conclusions would be changed  if the authors  had used a utility 
function  that  was consistent  with  people's apparent  preference  for rising 
consumption  over steady or declining  consumption,  even when faced 
with low real rates of return. Such preferences, if true, suggest that a 
path  of first  rising  and  then falling  consumption  is not optimal. 
Several panelists criticized the paper's treatment  of technological 
change. Nordhaus  found unconvincing  the cross-country  comparisons 
suggesting that lower population growth causes higher productivity 
growth,  because, he said, so many  other  factors can be at work. Phelps 
doubted  that  increased  labor  scarcity  would  lead  to greater  technological 
progress,  and  wondered  why decreased  capital  scarcity  would not have 
the opposite effect. Summers  defended the use of cross-country  com- 
parisons, remarking  that it would be hard to think of another natural 
experiment  with which to search  for these effects. Furthermore,  to the 
extent that movements in some unobserved  factor are responsible  for 
the apparent  correlation  of productivity  and fertility, there is no reason 
to think  the same  factor  is not at work  in the United States. At a minimum 
he felt that the cross-country comparisons defused any fear that a 
slowdown  in dynamism  would  accompany  a reduction  in the population 
growth  rate. Franco Modigliani,  while finding  it plausible that greater 
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should lead to faster growth in productivity.  Joseph Stiglitz observed 
that  returns-to-scale  effects in learning-by-doing  and endogenous  R&D 
models could give the opposite effect, with lower labor force growth 
adversely  affecting  productivity. 
Nordhaus  suggested  it would  be more  accurate  to weight  the nonmed- 
ical consumption  of the elderly at about 80 percent of that of working 
people. He also conjectured that if subsequent generations consume 
fewer market  goods but more  leisure, then it may not be optimal  to save 
less now. Summers  noted  that  the procedure  in the paper  accommodates 
the possibility  of increased  leisure  under  the assumption  that  it requires 
no capital and is separable  from ordinary  consumption in the utility 
function. Nordhaus  also thought  it useful to distinguish  three sources of 
slowing labor input: declines in fertility, reduced fraction of lifetime 
spent working,  and the rise in the disability  rate. Each of these sources 
would have a different  effect on optimal  saving  behavior. 
Several panelists discussed ways in which private sector saving and 
investment  are likely to be affected  by changed  demographics.  Modigli- 
ani noted that in the typical life-cycle model, when an economy grows 
less fast, it saves less. He conjectured  that the demographic  changes 
would automatically  reduce  private  saving, perhaps  even more  than  the 
authors  believed  optimal.  Gordon  noted  that  although  slower  population 
growth  is likely to lower  future  housing  prices, most of the effect of that 
reduction  would be in smaller  bequests to the young rather  than lower 
consumption  by the  elderly.  Phelps  observed  that  the  predicted  reduction 
in  investment  could  result  in  an  employment  problem  because  the  capital- 
goods sector is more  labor  intensive  than  the consumption-goods  sector. 
Wojnilower  observed that because the elderly will have more political 
power because of their  larger  share of the population,  perhaps  govern- 
ment  policy itself will  be directly  influenced  by the change  in demograph- 
ics. Gordon suggested two policy actions that offered solutions to the 
dependency problem.  The first was raising  the immigration-to-popula- 
tion ratio  to the 1913  level. The second was allowing  the retirement  age 
to increase  with life expectancy. D.  M. Cutler, J. M. Poterba,  L. M.  Sheiner,  and L. H.  Summers  71 
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